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THE CRIMINAL REGULATION OF LAWYERS
Bruce A. Green*
INTRODUCTIONO NE day last summer, the New York Times reported two arrests,
one of a Brooklyn assistant prosecutor for possessing drugs at a
rock concert' and another of a recent law school graduate (who hap-
pened to have interned in the Brooklyn prosecutors' office) for smug-
gling drugs into this country from Jamaica.2 These were the day's
reminders that, although lawyers are sworn to uphold the law and are
sometimes charged with enforcing the law, nothing in a law degree or
law license wards off the human impulses and temptations to break
the law.3
Because lawyers as a class are neither exempt from the reach of the
criminal law nor immune from criminal prosecution, the criminal law
plays a significant role in regulating lawyers. This role ordinarily is
not particularly interesting or troubling. Certainly, when lawyers are
acting outside of the professional setting, as in the case of a lawyer
caught with drugs at a rock concert, there is no reason why the crimi-
nal law should not apply to them straightforwardly. If anything, even
in their personal lives, lawyers may have a greater obligation than
others to uphold the criminal law.
Even when the criminal law applies to lawyers' professional con-
duct, its role will often be a welcome, not a troubling, one. For exam-
ple, the criminal law forbids a lawyer from embezzling clients' funds,
as do disciplinary provisions of the lawyer codes of professional con-
duct. The embezzlement or larceny statute reinforces the disciplinary
rules governing the safeguarding of client funds while providing an
alternative, and possibly more effective, enforcement mechanism.
The relationship between criminal law and other sources of profes-
sional norms, however, is not invariably such an easy one. Sometimes,
* Louis Stein Professor, Fordham University School of Law; Director, Louis
Stein Center for Law and Ethics; A.B. Princeton University, 1978; J.D. Columbia
University, 1981. I am grateful to Russell Pearce and Daniel Richman for their help-
ful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. See A Brooklyn Prosecutor Faces Drug Charges, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1998, at
B4.
2. See Joseph P. Fried, Law Graduate Is Charged with Drug Smuggling, N.Y.
Times, July 18, 1998, at B6.
3. See generally David Weisburd et al., Crimes of the Middle Classes 53, 55, 58
(1991) (reporting that a sample of white-collar criminal defendants, among whom
were 50 lawyers, disclosed that 14 were convicted of SEC violations, 15 committed
mail fraud, and approximately 30% committed tax violations some of which were
uncomplex). Weisburd concluded that "[h]igh occupational status may offer many
advantages in this world, but it appears to be neither a guarantee against becoming a
criminal nor an assurance that one's crimes will be organizationally complex." Id. at
91.
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there is a question about the distinction between a regulatory offense
and a crime: Where does "bad lawyering" end and "criminal lawyer-
ing" begin? This question arises when a criminal prosecution is predi-
cated on a lawyer's disciplinary violation, as was true in United States
v. Bronston,4 where a lawyer's prosecution for defrauding a client was
premised on the lawyer's failure to disclose a conflict of interest.5 As
Professor John Coffee has discussed,6 this theory of prosecution
presents a danger of overcriminalization-that is, that the lawyer's
conduct, although wrongful, does not deserve to be deemed criminal.7
The more frequent situation is the opposite one in which the profes-
sional conduct proscribed by the criminal law appears to be en-
couraged by the lawyer codes or professional lore. Here the question
is where "good lawyering" ends and "criminal lawyering" begins. For
example, State v. Mark Marks, P.A.8 involved a prosecution under a
Florida criminal statute that made it a crime for a lawyer to assist a
client in submitting an "incomplete statement in support of an insur-
ance claim."9 The prohibited conduct, it might be argued, is generally
encouraged by disciplinary provisions governing the preservation of
client confidences and by the professional understanding that, at least
in certain contexts, the principle of zealous advocacy requires lawyers
to withhold information that may be harmful to the client's cause.
Prosecuting a lawyer under this statute would present a danger of
overcriminalization in a different respect. Because it is not entirely
clear how the statute applies to lawyers' conduct, it may be unfair to
impose a criminal sanction on a lawyer who acted in accordance with
a plausible understanding of the professional norms. To be sure, the
public, acting through its legislature, may embrace a conception of
proper professional conduct that is at odds with the legal profession's
or the judiciary's conception and, accordingly, may enact a criminal
law that proscribes conduct that lawyers or judges believe should be
permissible. But except where the criminal law does so clearly, it
might seem excessive to brand as a criminal a lawyer who reasonably
relied on his understanding of the professional norms.
The tension between criminal law and professional norms is most
interesting, and most troubling, where the lawyer in question is a crim-
inal defense lawyer. Ordinarily, prosecutors are expected to be pro-
fessionally detached. Yet, the criminal law gives prosecutors authority
to regulate their professional adversaries-criminal defense lawyers.
4. 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981).
5. See id. at 922.
6. See John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminal-
ization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 117 (1981).
7. See id. at 130-42.
8. 698 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1997). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 241-49
and accompanying text.
9. Id. at 534-37.
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In this situation, the prosecutor's professional judgment and detach-
ment are to be trusted least. Consequently, there is a particular dan-
ger not only of overcriminalization, but of overdeterrence-that is, to
avoid the possibility of an unwarranted prosecution, lawyers may re-
frain from engaging in lawful conduct that is professionally desirable.
For example, in United States v. Cueto,10 the federal obstruction-of-
justice statute was recently applied to a lawyer who, seeking to protect
a corporate client from federal criminal prosecution, undertook vari-
ous litigation including an initially successful state-court motion to en-
join a state investigator from interfering with the client's business.1"
The criminalization of this conduct might be considered excessive,
given the obstruction statute's lack of clarity and the conventional un-
derstandings about a lawyer's duty of zealous advocacy in the context
of a white-collar criminal investigation. But even if this conviction
was deserved in light of the venality of this particular law\yer's inten-
tions, other lawyers who are uncertain about the reach of the statute
and about how a prosecutor may perceive their conduct may now re-
frain from advocating for clients in criminal cases in ways and with
intentions that courts would consider to be legitimate. What makes
the risk of overdeterrence particularly troubling is that, in a criminal
case, the rendition of zealous representation is not simply desirable
and encouraged by the law, but to some extent constitutionally
mandated.
This Article examines these problems and takes a modest stab at a
response. By way of background, part I provides a broad outline of
the criminal law's regulatory role. Often, the professional conduct
covered by the criminal law would in any case be forbidden by disci-
plinary rules. But, the criminal law allows prosecutors to enforce
these standards of conduct, thereby encouraging compliance with pro-
fessional norms that coincide with the dictates of the criminal law.
Additionally, criminal law independently establishes professional
norms by proscribing conduct that might otherwise be professionally
permissible. It also influences the development of disciplinary rules
that encourage lawyers to avoid criminal misconduct. Finally, criminal
law plays a collateral role in the lawyer licensing process-a role that
prosecutors may take into account when deciding whether to investi-
gate or prosecute a lawyer.
Part II discusses the tension between the criminal law and other
professional norms, describing how the professional norms might be
understood to encourage conduct that is forbidden by criminal provi-
sions. Two sets of examples are highlighted, the first involving acces-
sorial liability and the second involving obstruction-of-justice
provisions.
10. 151 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 1998).
11. See id. at 626-29.
1998]
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Part III looks at how courts and the Restatement of the Law Gov-
erning Lawyers respond to this problem. It describes a range of re-
sponses. In some cases, including federal cases such as Cueto
involving the professional conduct of a criminal defense lawyer, courts
have been fairly indifferent to the possibility that the lawyer on trial
may have lacked fair notice that his conduct was proscribed and that
future lawyers will be deterred from engaging in legitimate advocacy.
These decisions underscore that lawyers, above all others, are ex-
pected to know the law and to comply with it. In other cases, such as
Mark Marks, courts have responded to this problem more sympatheti-
cally, dismissing the prosecution of a lawyer on the ground that the
criminal law was not sufficiently clear in its intent to apply to the pro-
fessional conduct at issue. Other courts, taking a middle ground, have
determined that professional norms that might have encouraged the
conduct in question may be considered by the fact-finder in evaluating
the lawyer's conduct, but do not necessarily foreclose the possibility of
a prosecution and conviction. The Restatement, also taking a middle
ground, suggests that, in construing a criminal provision that might
apply to a lawyer's professional conduct, courts should resolve ambi-
guities by giving weight to "[t]he traditional and appropriate activities
of lawyers in representing clients consistent with the requirements of
the applicable lawyer code .... "I'
Finally, part IV offers two proposals. First, it suggests that, as an
interpretive matter, courts should give greater deference to profes-
sional norms than the Restatement contemplates. Second, it suggests
that, as a matter of discretion, prosecutors should consider deferring
to the disciplinary process to resolve ambiguities about whether a law-
yer's professional conduct was unlawful, rather than employing a
criminal prosecution to resolve factual or legal uncertainties.
I. THE ROLE OF CRIMINAL LAW IN THE REGULATION OF
LAWYERS
Although, as previously noted, the Restatement's chapter on the
regulation of the legal profession includes a provision on "Lawyer
Criminal Offense,"13 writings on lawyer regulation generally give
short shrift to the significance of the criminal prosecutor's role in the
lawyer regulatory scheme. For example, in his article, Who Should
Regulate Lawyers?, 4 David Wilkins presented an overview of en-
forcement systems that identifies disciplinary controls (characterized
by the current disciplinary system), liability controls (involving law-
suits by injured clients and other private parties), institutional controls
12. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 8 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 2, 1998).
13. See id.
14. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 799
(1992).
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(involving the imposition of sanctions by courts and administrative
agencies for improprieties by lawyers appearing before them), and
legislative controls (involving the proposed establishment of an ad-
ministrative agency to investigate and prosecute lawyer misconduct),
but made no mention of criminal controls.15 Likewise, in a Foreword
to the special issue of a law review on "Institutional Choices in the
Regulation of Lawyers," Ted Schneyer described the multiplicity of
institutions regulating lawyers, 6 including "legal institutions with
broad missions that include some incidental regulation of lawyers," 17
but did not identify criminal law enforcement agencies as being
among these.'
As described below, criminal law plays several roles in the regula-
tion of lawyers. To the extent that criminal law proscribes conduct
that is also proscribed by disciplinary norms, the criminal law allows
criminal prosecutors a role, alongside that of disciplinary agencies and
others, in enforcing standards of professional conduct. Additionally,
criminal law has a role in defining the standards of professional con-
duct governing lawyers directly and, by influencing the drafters of dis-
ciplinary rules, indirectly. Finally, criminal law has a collateral role in
the licensing process, in that the commission of a crime may serve as a
ground for denying an individual admission to practice law or for sus-
pending or disbarring a lawyer.
A. Criminal Enforcement of Professional Norms
The criminal law plays a role in enforcing professional standards. In
many instances, professional conduct that is defined as improper by
professional rules is also proscribed by the criminal law. For example,
the willful misappropriation of client funds may be not only a viola-
tion of disciplinary rules governing safekeeping of client funds, 9 but
also the crime of embezzlement or larceny.20 Likewise, deliberately
billing a client for work never performed may constitute not only a
breach of disciplinary rules governing reasonable fees2 and honesty in
dealing with clients,' but also a criminal fraud. 3 As a result, a lawyer
15. See id. at 805-09.
16. See Ted Schneyer, Legal Process Scholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers,
65 Fordham L. Rev. 33, 33 (1996).
17. Id. at 35.
18. See id. at 35-38.
19. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 9-102 (1981); Model Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 1.15(a) (1983).
20. See, e.g., In re Hampton, 602 N.Y.S.2d 480 (App. Div. 1993) (involving a law-
yer's previous plea of guilty to petit larceny based on the misappropriation of client
funds).
21. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106; Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct Rule 1.5.
22. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.4; cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 379 (1993) (opining that billing more
than one client for the same time violates the Model Rules). See generally Lisa G.
1998]
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who engages in certain professional misconduct faces the risk of a
criminal sanction, such as imprisonment, which would be more harsh
than professional discipline or civil liability. Additionally, because the
criminal process may be more effective than either the disciplinary or
the civil process, lawyers who engage in misconduct proscribed by the
criminal law may face a more substantial risk of discovery and
punishment.
By proscribing certain professional conduct, the criminal law allows
criminal prosecutors to serve as institutional regulators of lawyers'
professional behavior. The cases in which lawyers are prosecuted for
professional wrongdoing, such as the misappropriation of client funds
or fraudulent billing of clients, are legion. Prosecutions for offenses
such as obstruction of justice committed on behalf of clients are also
common. Perhaps the best known example is the criminal prosecution
of Clarence Darrow for allegedly participating in bribing a juror.24 A
more colorful example is recounted in the history of the turn-of-the-
century New York City law firm of Howe & Hummel, 5 described as
"the Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft of low practice."2 6 The law
firm, which practiced in the areas of criminal and civil litigation and
entertainment law, owed some part of its considerable success, profit,
and renown to the practices of bribing judges, suborning perjury, and
extortion.27 Only after Howe's death did the New York district attor-
ney manage to put the law firm out of business by securing a criminal
conviction of Hummel for suborning perjury in a civil lawsuit. The
conviction came after a lengthy period during which Hummel's min-
ions kept the prosecution's principal witness beyond the prosecution's
reach and "very nearly succeeded in debauching [him] to death. '2 8
Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 659 (1990) (analyzing the deception of
clients by lawyers); Sonia S. Chan, Note, ABA Formal Opinion 93-379: Double Bill-
ing, Padding and Other Forms of Overbilling, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 611 (1996) (dis-
cussing unethical billing practices).
23. See Lee A. Watson, Note, Communication, Honesty, and Contract: Three
Buzzwords for Maintaining Ethical Hourly Billing, 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 189, 189-90
& nn.2-3 (1998) (citing cases of lawyers convicted for billing fraud); see also United
States v. D'Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1252 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding insufficient evidence to
support a lawyer's mail fraud conviction where the lawyer's bills concealed from those
in control of the corporate client the nature of his relationship with, and work for, the
corporation); United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 461 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
billing for services never performed is fraudulent even if payment is due for other
services rendered).
24. See Geoffrey Cowan, The People v. Clarence Darrow: The Bribery Trial of
America's Greatest Lawyer (1993).
25. See generally Richard H. Rovere, Howe & Hummel (1947) (discussing clients
and methods of operation of the most successful and notorious law office in New
York City at the turn of the century).
26. Id. at 123.
27. See id. at 73, 77, 91.
28. Id. at 157.
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The literature on corporate and white-collar crime has given atten-
tion to criminal prosecutions of lawyers29 in part because of the dan-
ger of overcriminalization-that is, that the charged conduct, although
wrongful, does not deserve to be sanctioned criminally. The context
in which this danger has elicited particular concern is where the prose-
cution of a lawyer is predicated, in part, on the lawyer's violation of
disciplinary standards. Examples might include criminal prosecutions
in which a disciplinary violation is offered as circumstantial evidence
to prove that the lawyer possessed criminal intent3" or to rebut a claim
that the lawyer's intent was innocent.31 The most frequently cited ex-
ample, however, is United States v. Bronston,32 in which a disciplinary
violation was essentially an element of the charged offense.3
29. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, White Collar Crime: Cases and Materials 807-17
(2d ed. 1998) (discussing the decision to uphold a lawyer's mail and travel fraud con-
victions in a section on "fraud upon clients" as part of chapter on "criminal and civil
liability of professionals"); Jerold H. Israel et al., White Collar Crime: Law and Prac-
tice 169-72 (1996) (explaining a decision to uphold a lawyer's mail fraud conviction
under a topic titled "Breach of a Fiduciary Duty" in a chapter on mail and wire
fraud); id- at 172-77 (noting a decision vacating a lawyer's mail fraud conviction under
a topic titled "intent" in a chapter on mail and wire fraud).
30. See United States v. Machi, 811 F.2d 991, 1001 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 520 (4th Cir. 1979). In Klauber, a lawyer who represented
plaintiffs in personal injury cases was charged with seeking inflated charges from doc-
tors which could be used to obtain inflated settlements from insurance companies.
The court held that the lawyer's violation of a disciplinary rule was properly offered
and considered by the jury as proof of "the attitude Klauber, as a member of the Bar,
should have maintained toward practices that were proven." Id. (citing United States
v. Reamer, 589 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1978)).
31. For example, in United States v. Zeman, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 29842 (6th Cir.
Nov. 9,1992), the defendant, a lawyer for the kingpin of a drug organization, paid the
lawyer for a courier in the organization in order to induce that lawyer to advise his
client to become a fugitive rather than testifying for the government. See id. at *3.
The payments vere not disclosed to the client. See id. at *18-*19. The defendant was
tried and convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) of witness tampering, and the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the decision. See id. at *1-'2. In order to rebut the defendant's at-
tempt to show that this was an ethical third-party payment of a fee under Model Rule
1.8(0, the government was permitted to introduce testimony that his conduct was in
fact unethical. See id. at *13-*14, *30-*31.
32. 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981).
33. See id. at 927. Another example is United States v. Drury, 687 F.2d 63 (5th Cir.
1982). Drury represented plaintiffs in personal injury actions on a contingent-fee ba-
sis. See id. at 63. He received 40% of the recovery after the deduction of expenses.
See hiL He referred most of his clients to one particular physician, a Dr. Macaluso,
who served as an expert witness. See id. Pursuant to an agreement that was not dis-
closed to the clients, Drury paid Macaluso only 85% of the doctor's medical bill while
the rest was pocketed by Drury himself. See id. Drury was convicted of defrauding his
clients and the conviction was upheld. See id. at 64, 66. There was no showing that the
doctor's fee was inflated to take account of the 15% kicked back to Drury. See id. at
64. The theory was that Drury deprived the clients of information that he had a fidu-
ciary duty to reveal. See id. at 64-65. The principal source of this duty was DR 5-107
of the Louisiana Code of Professional Responsibility, which established a duty to dis-
close compensation from a third party in connection with representation of a client.
See hi. at 64-65.
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The defendant in Bronston was both a state senator and a partner of
Rosenman & Colin, a New York City law firm.34 The firm agreed to
represent a group of minority investors in BusTop Shelters, Inc., that
was seeking to renew its bus stop shelter franchise in New York City.35
At around the same time that the firm started to provide investment
advice to these individual clients, Bronston began to provide legal
assistance to a friend, Saul Steinberg, who was seeking to compete for
the New York City franchise and for other bus stop shelter franchises
elsewhere.36 With his firm's knowledge and reluctant approval, Bron-
ston began by directing a law firm associate to set up a shell corpora-
tion, Convenience and Safety Corp. ("C&S"), that would serve as
Steinberg's vehicle for the bus stop shelter competition.37
Over the succeeding months, Rosenman & Colin represented the
minority investors in negotiating the terms of their investment in Bus-
Top and Bronston participated in some meetings at the law firm re-
garding this work.38 Meanwhile, apparently unknown to his partners,
Bronston expanded his professional relationship with Steinberg and
C&S, which named him to its Board of Directors.39 Although a differ-
ent law firm assumed responsibility for representing C&S in its efforts
to obtain the New York City franchise, Bronston received information
about the status of C&S's bid, billed C&S for reviewing one piece of
correspondence, and sent a letter on state senate letterhead to the city
comptroller opposing the renewal of BusTop's franchise.4"
The grand jury indicted Bronston under the federal mail fraud stat-
ute, which makes it a crime not only to defraud by false statements,
but also, in some cases, by material omissions.41 As interpreted by
federal courts, a "fraud" committed by nondisclosure or concealment,
as opposed to an affirmative misrepresentation, required a defend-
ant's breach of a fiduciary duty to disclose information under circum-
stances where the withholding can harm the one to whom the
defendant owes a fiduciary duty.4" Bronston was tried and convicted
of mail fraud on the theory that he had breached a fiduciary duty
owed to clients of his law firm by not disclosing that he had under-
taken a representation in conflict with their interests.43 Over a dis-
sent, the court of appeals upheld Bronston's conviction on this theory,
For an example of a criminal contempt prosecution of a lawyer predicated on a
perceived violation of professional norms, see United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332
(9th Cir. 1981), discussed infra at notes 172-73.
34. See United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 922 (2d Cir. 1981).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 922-23.
38. See id. at 923.
39. See id. at 924.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 925.
42. See id. at 926.
43. See id. at 927.
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citing Disciplinary Rule 5-105 of the state's Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility as evidence of Bronston's fiduciary duty to the BusTop
investors. The court reasoned that since BusTop investors were cli-
ents of his law firm, Bronston had a duty not to "promot[e] the inter-
ests of Steinberg and C&S in competition and conflict with those of
the BusTop investors."'
Troubled by the premise that the mail fraud statute should be inter-
preted to criminalize certain breaches of a fiduciary duty, some crimi-
nal law scholars have criticized Bronston 5 Even if one embraces that
premise, however, Bronston is nonetheless a troubling decision be-
cause it erroneously assumes that disciplinary rules governing conflicts
of interest establish fiduciary duties to the clients of one's law firm.
As discussed below, the conflict rules are more restrictive than the
common law of agency that, independently of the lawyer codes, estab-
lishes a lawyer's fiduciary duties to a client. Therefore, even if it is not
excessively harsh to make a federal criminal case out of a lawyer's
fiduciary breach, it may be excessively harsh to make one out of a
lawyer's violation of a prophylactic disciplinary rule dealing with con-
flicts of interest.
In general, disciplinary rules are not meant either to codify lawyers'
common-law duties to their clients and others or to serve as an in-
dependent basis of civil liability. They are meant exclusively to serve
as regulatory provisions that guide lawyers and provide a basis for
disciplining them.4 The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
make plain that, although disciplinary rules are "a just basis for a law-
yer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the adminis-
tration of a disciplinary authority," they should not be "deemed to
augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary
consequences of violating such a duty."47 In light of their intended
purposes, many disciplinary rules are cast in highly general terms,
their meaning and scope left uncertain at the margins. They are un-
derstood to be general principles, which may be amplified, or even
44. Id. at 927. Additionally, with respect to other elements of the crime, the court
found that Bronston had "intent to defraud" (based on his secretly undertaking a
representation that could harm the firm's clients). See id. The court also found that
the concealment of the fact of his representation was material. See id. at 928 ("This
was no mere technical failure on a law firm's part to disclose all potential conflicts of
interest to its clients. One can imagine few nondisclosures more crucial ....").
45. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 130-42 (criticizing Bronston); Daniel J. Hurson,
Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute-A Legislative Approach, 20 Am. Crim. L
Rev. 423, 448-64 (1983) (same). But see Craig M. Bradley, Mail Fraud After McNally
and Carpenter: The Essence of Fraud, 79 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 573, 603 (1988)
(defending Bronston).
46. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Scope; see also Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility Preliminary Statement ("The Code is designed to be adopted
by appropriate agencies both as an inspirational guide to the members of the profes-
sion and as a basis for disciplinary action when the conduct of a lawyer falls below the
required minimum standards stated in the Disciplinary Rules.").
47. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Scope.
1998]
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superseded, by standards of conduct reflected in common understand-
ings or set forth in bar association ethics opinions or judicial deci-
sions.48 Individual lawyers are afforded some discretion in deciding
how the rules apply to them, particularly in situations involving legal
48. For example, the court in International Electronics Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d
1288 (2d Cir. 1975), noted:
It behooves this court ... while mindful of the existing Code, to examine
afresh the problems sought to be met by that Code, to weigh for itself what
those problems are, how real in the practical world they are in fact, and
whether a mechanical and didactic application of the Code to all situations
automatically might not be productive of more harm than good, by requiring
the client and the judicial system to sacrifice more than the value of the
presumed benefits.
Id. at 1293 (quoting the brief of the Connecticut Bar Association); see also Niesig v.
Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1032 (N.Y. 1990) ("While unquestionably important, and
respected by the courts, the code does not have the force of law." (citation omitted));
S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. Partnership v. 777 S. H. Corp., 508 N.E.2d 647, 650 (N.Y.
1987) ("When we agree that the Code applies in an equitable manner... we should
not hestitate to enforce it with vigor. When we find an area of uncertainty, however,
we must use our judicial process to make our own decision in the interests of justice to
all concerned." (quoting Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1360 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Gurfein, J., concurring)); Elliott T. Cheatham & Gabriel I. Lewis, Committees on
Legal Ethics, 24 Cal. L. Rev. 28, 37-38 (1936) (opining that bar association ethics
committees "should go beyond the letter of" the lawyer code and base its judgments
on "foundation principles, the purposes of the judicial system and its jurisprudence,
the privileges and duties of lawyers and the best and most reasonable and practical
methods of obtaining them" (quoting the Committee on Professional Ethics of the
New York County Lawyers' Association)); Bruce A. Green, Doe v. Grievance Com-
mittee: On the Interpretation of Ethical Rules, 55 Brook. L. Rev. 485, 537-38 (1989)
[hereinafter Green, Interpretation of Ethical Rules] (arguing that the court has discre-
tion "to decide for itself how most appropriately to interpret an ambiguous discipli-
nary rule, just as the court would be free, in the absence of a body of rules, to define
attorney misconduct as an exercise of its inherent supervisory authority over
attorneys").
For example, it is understood that prosecutors may direct their investigators to en-
gage in deceitful conduct in gathering evidence of past criminal conduct, notwith-
standing rules forbidding lawyers from engaging in deceitful conduct and from doing
indirectly through their agents what they are forbidden from doing themselves. See
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(a)(c). Notwithstanding these same
prohibitions, courts have recognized that lawyers and their investigators may also use
deceit to gather evidence of ongoing wrongdoing in civil rights and other civil cases.
See, e.g., Apple Corps Ltd. v. International Collectors Soc'y, No. Civ. 96-1571, 1998
WL 345078, at *20 (D.N.J. June 26, 1998) ("[A] public or private lawyer's use of an
undercover investigator to detect ongoing violations of the law is not ethically
proscribed.").
Limits on the reach of the conflict of interest rules have also been recognized that
have not been based on the language of these rules but are essentially a matter of
judicial decree. For example, courts have recognized that the rule of vicarious dis-
qualification may not apply in the same way to large law firms as it applies to small
ones, see S & S Hotel Ventures, 508 N.E.2d at 648-52, in the same way to legal aid
offices as it applies to private law firms, see United States v. Reynoso, 6 F. Supp. 2d
269, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), and in the same way to conflicts of interest that arise unex-
pectedly mid-representation as to conflicts existing at the outset, see, e.g., Bank Brus-
sels Lambert v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., No. 93 Civ. 5298, 1996 WL 346009, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1996) (denying a motion to disqualify a law firm where a new
lawyer of the firm formerly worked for the opposing party's law firm).
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or factual uncertainty, not only because the rules are not meant to be
applied didactically and inflexibly, but also because, in the long run,
lawyers are most likely to act ethically when they are encouraged to
exercise independent moral judgment concerning their proposed con-
duct.49 It is anticipated that, acting in areas of uncertainty, lawyers
will sometimes engage in conduct that later appears to be wrongful
from the retrospective, objective viewpoint of disciplinary authorities,
but that if the lawyer is found to have acted in good faith, then a
disciplinary agency will decline to bring disciplinary charges or seek a
token sanction.50
Some commentators have argued that a disciplinary violation
should be deemed a violation of the lawyer's duty of care under negli-
gence law, both as a doctrinal matter, because disciplinary rules ex-
press the legal profession's minimal standard of conduct expected of
lawyers, and as a regulatory matter, because civil liability for discipli-
nary violations would promote the policies underlying the disciplinary
rules and encourage compliance with them, thus compensating for the
deficiencies of the disciplinary process.-" This approach, affording pri-
vate parties an opportunity to seek damages for disciplinary violations
that inure to their detriment, would make sense if the rules were in-
tended to be strongly enforced even at the margins. Consistent with
the intention of the drafters of the disciplinary rules that lawyers be
allowed to exercise discretion in areas of ambiguity, however, courts
have declined to equate a disciplinary infraction with an actionable
breach of the lawyer's fiduciary duty.s2
49. See generally David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics
Teaching in Dark Times, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 31 (1995) (discussing the idea that
good moral judgment is the heart of legal ethics).
50. See Bruce A. Green, Lawyer Discipline: Conscientious Noncompliance, Con-
scious Avoidance, and Prosecutorial Discretion, 66 Fordham L Rev. 1307 (1998) (dis-
cussing the situation in which a disciplinary prosecutor might decline to bring charges
against a lawyer who had violated a disciplinary rule as a matter of personal
conscience).
51. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure
of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C. L. Rev. 281, 286-95 (1979).
52. See Baxt v. Liloia, 664 A.2d 948, 949 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), affd as
modified, 714 A.2d 271 (N.J. 1998); Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646, 651 (Wash.
1992). While rejecting the view that a violation of the ethics code in and of itself
creates a private right of action, courts have found that in a malpractice action, an
ethics provision may be relevant to establishing the standard of care required of attor-
neys. For example, the Michigan Court of Appeals has held that a violation of the
Code is rebuttable evidence of malpractice. See Lipton v. Boesky, 313 N.W.2d 163,
167 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). The Tenth Circuit has held it proper for an expert witness
to rely on Code provisions in giving an opinion on the standard of care expected of
lawyers in the community. See Miami Int'l Realty Co. v. Paynter, 841 F.2d 348, 353
(10th Cir. 1988). For discussions of the role of ethical rules in malpractice cases, see
Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 18.7, at 576-85 (4th ed.
1996); John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 Rutgers
L. Rev. 101 (1995); David Luban, Ethics and Malpractice, 12 Miss. C. L Rev. 151
(1991); Gary A. Munneke & Anthony E. Davis, The Standard of Care in Legal Mal-
practice: Do the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Define 1I, 27 J. Legal Prof. 33
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Given that disciplinary violations standing alone do not establish
civil liability, it seems obvious that they should not serve as the basis
of criminal liability. A basic principle of criminal jurisprudence is that
not every moral or ethical transgression should be a crime;53 nor
(1997-98); Susan Taylor Wall & Joseph R. Weston, An Analysis of Current Theories of
Liability, 45 S.C. L. Rev. 851 (1994); Note, The Evidentiary Use of the Ethics Codes in
Legal Malpractice: Erasing a Double Standard, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1102 (1996); Ann
Peters, Note, The Model Rules as a Guide for Legal Malpractice, 6 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 609 (1993).
Courts have sometimes found that civil liability may not be predicated in any way
on disciplinary misconduct. A leading case in point is Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d
485 (4th Cir. 1991). The Maryland law firm charged with malpractice in that case had
represented the purchaser of two companies. See id. at 488. In the course of the nego-
tiations, the firm's client misrepresented its net worth. See id. After the transaction
was concluded, the client failed to make full payment and filed for bankruptcy. See id.
The seller's civil lawsuit against the purchaser's law firm contained various theories of
liability. See id. The plaintiffs acknowledged that the firm itself had made no affirma-
tive misrepresentations. See id. They alleged, however, that the law firm had known
about its clients' misrepresentations but had remained silent, while continuing to as-
sist in closing the deal. See id. at 489. The plaintiffs secured an opinion from the
Maryland State Bar Association's Committee on Ethics to the effect that in this situa-
tion the law firm had a duty under Maryland's Code of Professional Responsibility
either to withdraw from the representation or to make the truth known to the sellers.
See id. The Fourth Circuit, however, rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the law
firm's ethical violation should suffice to establish civil liability under Rule 10b-5,
under Maryland common law of negligence, or as a matter of public policy. See id. at
492-94. Rejecting all three claims, the court found that public policy counseled
against the imposition of civil liability. See id. at 493-94. It explained:
Any other result may prevent a client from reposing complete trust in his
lawyer for fear that he might reveal a fact which would trigger the lawyer's
duty to the third party. Similarly, if attorneys had a duty to disclose informa-
tion to third parties, attorneys would have an incentive not to press clients
for information. The net result would not be less securities fraud. Instead,
attorneys would more often be unwitting accomplices to the fraud as a result
of being kept in the dark by their clients or by their own reluctance to obtain
information. The better rule-that attorneys have no duty to "blow the
whistle" on their clients-allows clients to repose complete trust in their law-
yers. Under those circumstances, the client is more likely to disclose damag-
ing or problematic information, and the lawyer will more likely be able to
counsel his client against misconduct.
Id. at 493.
53. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct.
2199 (1997). The defendant in O'Hagan, a lawyer, was a partner of a Minneapolis
firm that was retained as local counsel by a large British company called Grand Met
that was interested in acquiring Pillsbury Company, a Minneapolis company. Id. at
614. Aware of this confidential information, O'Hagan purchased call options for the
Pillsbury stock. See id. When Grand Met publicly announced its tender offer for Pills-
bury stock, and Pillsbury stock rose from $39 to almost $60 a share, O'Hagan exer-
cised his options, netting a profit of over $4 million. See id. He was convicted of 57
counts of securities fraud, mail fraud, and money laundering. See id. The Eighth Cir-
cuit overturned O'Hagan's convictions, essentially because (contrary to other federal
circuit courts) it construed the securities fraud statute in a manner that did not reach
this conduct. See id. at 622. In the Eighth Circuit's view, O'Hagan had no fiduciary
duty to Pillsbury or its shareholders. See id. at 627. Although O'Hagan did have a
fiduciary duty to Grand Met and to his law firm and had breached his duty to each in
exploiting nonpublic information about the proposed acquisition of Pillsbury, the
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should every regulatory violation.' Disciplinary rules often fail to
provide sufficiently clear notice of the proscribed conduct and, more
importantly, even where particular conduct is clearly proscribed, a
criminal sanction will often be unduly harsh.
The conflict rules in particular are not meant to codify or to estab-
lish fiduciary duties owed by lawyers to their clients for purposes of
civil or criminal law. Although the conflict rules establish restrictions
and might be said to establish duties owed to the public, these rules
are not coextensive with the lawyer's fiduciary duty of loyalty derived
from the common law of agency. The conflict rules are more restric-
tive than agency law partly because they are rules of risk avoidance 5
and partly because they are designed to avoid public appearances of
improper conduct.
56
DR 5-105, the rule cited in Bronston, serves as an illustration. DR
5-105(A) and (B) govern the concurrent representation of clients with
inconsistent interests, forbidding an individual lawyer from beginning
or continuing to represent multiple clients if the representation of one
"will be or is likely to be adversely affected" by the lawyer's represen-
tation of another, or "if it would be likely to be adversely affected by
[the lawyer's] representation of another client."' ' The vicarious dis-
qualification provision, DR 5-105(D), provides in turn that when any
Eighth Circuit believed that securities fraud liability may not be premised on this
impropriety. See id. In its opinion, the court took pains to conclude:
Our ruling today should in no manner be understood as condoning
O'Hagan's conduct.... Such conduct is certainly unethical and immoral and
must be condemned, which we make haste to do.... However, it is a funda-
mental principle of the criminal law that not every ethical or moral trans-
gression falls within its realm. This case is a prime example of that principle.
Id. at 628. Although the Supreme Court reversed, it did not reject this general princi-
ple. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2213.
54. Consistent with this limitation, in United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1025
(8th Cir. 1978), a disciplinary violation was held to be irrelevant to the prosecution of
a state legislator who had assisted an architectural firm in obtaining contracts for state
construction work in exchange for a fee. Although Rabbitt had clearly violated DR 8-
101, which governs the conduct of lawyers in their role as public officials, the court
found that he had not acted fraudulently. See id. Since Rabbitt had no official duty
regarding awarding contracts, the court found, he did not deprive the public of hon-
esty in his official duties. See id Further, disregarding the disciplinary rule as a source
of a disclosure obligation, it found that he had no affirmative duty to disclose his
interest in the architectural contracts. See id.
55. See 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A
Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct § 1.7:101, at 223 (2d ed. 1990
& Supp. 1996) (observing that "[in the modem view, a conflict of interest exists
whenever the attorney-client relationship or the quality of the representation is 'at
risk,' even if no substantive impropriety-such as a breach of confidentiality or less
than zealous representation-in fact eventuates"); Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Inter-
est in Litigation. The Judicial Role, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 71, 71-72 (1996).
56. See Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Legal Representation: Should the
Appearance of Impropriety Rule Be Eliminated in New Jersey-Or Revived Every-
where Else?, 28 Seton Hall L. Rev. 315 (1997).
57. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-105 (1981).
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one member of a firm is forbidden by DR 5-105(A) or (B) from "ac-
cept[ing] or continu[ing] such employment," no other lawyer in the
firm may knowingly do so.58 These are prophylactic rules. They are
intended in part to prevent violations of a lawyer's fiduciary duties of
confidentiality and competence. But a lawyer who violates these rules
has not necessarily breached a confidence or rendered substandard
assistance; indeed, in Bronston, the government did not seek to estab-
lish that Bronston misused client confidences of the BusTop investors,
or that Bronston caused the law firm to render them inadequate legal
assistance.
The conflict rules are also intended in part to prevent violations of
the duty of loyalty, but they do so by expanding on lawyers' fiduciary
duty of loyalty under agency law. Consequently, a conflict violation is
not invariably a breach of the duty of loyalty any more than it is inva-
riably a breach of the duties of confidentiality and competence. This
was true even under the earlier ABA Canons of Professional Ethics,
which deemed it "unprofessional to represent conflicting interests"
without consent, and explained that "a lawyer represents conflicting
interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose. ' 59 One implica-
tion was that the restriction recognized by the Canon is a matter of
professional ethics, but not necessarily civil law. Another was that, as
traditionally understood, the fiduciary duty of loyalty was no greater
than the restriction against contending for that which the lawyer is
duty-bound to oppose. The later Code of Professional Responsibility,
which also did not speak in terms of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, im-
posed a broader professional limitation than the Canons by restricting
any representation that was "likely" to involve representing differing
interests. Even if one were to equate the representation of "differing
interests" with a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, not every dis-
ciplinary violation under the Code would eventuate in disloyalty.
It would surely have been a fiduciary breach, as well as a discipli-
nary violation that went to the core of the conflict rule, if Bronston or
Rosenman & Colin secretly undertook to help C&S obtain the New
York City franchise after agreeing to assist BusTop to obtain the same
franchise.6" But what took place in Bronston was considerably re-
moved from that. Rosenman & Colin did not represent BusTop in
seeking to renew the New York City franchise; it represented individ-
58. Id. at DR 5-105(D).
59. Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 6 (1947).
60. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-105 (restricting a lawyer
from undertaking representation where the lawyer's representation of one client may
be impaired because of the lawyer's duty to the other client); see also Greene v.
Greene, 391 N.E.2d 1355, 1357-58 (N.Y. 1979) (observing that, even with the consent
of both clients, it would rarely be permissible for a lawyer to request two adverse
parties with respect to the same subject matter of a legal proceeding "[b]ecause dual
representation is fraught with the potential for irreconcilable conflict").
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ual minority investors in their relationship with majority investors in
BusTop. There was room to argue that Bronston, as a member of the
firm, was not barred from providing some assistance to C&S simply
because his law firm was providing investment assistance to individu-
als who were investing in a different company that was competing for
the same franchise:6' Rosenman & Colin's advice to the BusTop in-
vestors and its assistance in their negotiations was not likely to be "ad-
versely affected" by Bronston's work for C&S. Additionally, although
BusTop and C&S had different interests, the concurrent representa-
tion may not have involved "representing differing interests," since the
interests of C&S in obtaining the New York City franchise were not
necessarily inconsistent with the limited interest of the minority inves-
tors that Rosenman & Colin was representing-namely, the interest in
investing in BusTop on favorable terms. 62 But even assuming that
61. The trial court refused to admit expert testimony on behalf of Bronston con-
cerning the application of the disciplinary rules. See United States v. Bronston, 658
F.2d 920, 930 (2d Cir. 1981).
62. It has been understood that the restriction on "representing differing inter-
ests" is not implicated when two clients have differing interests with regard to a par-
ticular matter unless each client has retained the law firm to represent the relevant
interests. See New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 350
(1974) (stating that a lawyer representing a bank may undertake to represent a bor-
rower in an unrelated transaction with the bank and that the bank's consent is not
required "[s]ince the lawyer would not be representing the bank in this transaction").
There is an additional restriction, however, that is implicit in DR 5-101(A) & (B)
and that may have applied in Bronston. That is, a lawyer may not represent a client if
the representation will be directly adverse to another client, even if the two represen-
tations are entirely unrelated. See, eg., Stratagem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l N.V., 756
F. Supp. 789, 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that a law firm may not represent the
plaintiff corporation in a lawsuit against the defendant corporation while simultane-
ously representing a subsidiary of the defendant corporation in unrelated labor mat-
ters). In general, this means that "a lawyer may not sue a current client on behalf of
another client, even in an unrelated matter, unless consent is obtained." Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 209 cmt. e (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,
1996). This principle is codified in Rule 1.7(a) of the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. The underlying premise is that, when a lawyer's activities are directly
adverse to a current client, as is true when a lawyer appears in litigation against a
client, the client will reasonably perceive that the law.vyer is acting disloyally and the
client's trust and confidence in the lawyer will be harmed as a result. This does not
mean, however, that a lawyer must refrain from all activities unrelated to the repre-
sentation of a particular client that may undermine that client's interests or frustrate
his or her objectives. Such a broad restriction would contravene other important pub-
lic interests, including the interest in enabling others to obtain counsel of choice.
Consequently, some understand that the restriction applies only in the limited circum-
stances where a lawyer seeks to represent a client in litigation or equivalent adver-
sarial proceedings against another client. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal
Ethics 357 (1986) [hereinafter Wolfram, Legal Ethics] (discussing In re Ainsworth,
614 P.2d 1127 (1980)); see also Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(a) cmt.
(1989) ("[Slimultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests
are only generally adverse, such as competing economic enterprises, does not require
consent of the respective clients."). Bronston might have argued that this implicit
restriction was inapplicable because, although C&S was in competition with BusTop
for a business opportunity, the companies were not direct adversaries as would be
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Bronston violated the disciplinary rule, it does not follow that his con-
duct was a fiduciary breach for purposes of civil liability, much less
that it should be punished criminally. As Jack Coffee argued shortly
after Bronston's conviction, as a matter of everyday morality, "pro-
phylactic rules, such as the prohibition on accepting clients with con-
flicting interests, constitute a penumbra around the essential criminal
activity they are designed to prevent, such as fraud and deceit, but are
not themselves the subject of criminal prohibitions. '63 Thus, to predi-
cate a criminal conviction on a disciplinary violation "overlooks the
basic distinction evident to the ordinary citizen between a failure to
observe a prophylactic rule designed to prevent fiduciary misconduct
and actual predatory conduct."'
In the end, the Bronston decision is troubling both from a regula-
tory perspective because it seems to criminalize virtually any violation
of the conflict rules, thereby leaving it to the discretion of prosecutors
to decide whether or not to bring criminal charges against a lawyer
who had an impermissible conflict, and from a doctrinal perspective
because it appears to assume that disciplinary rules generally, and the
conflict-of-interest rules in particular, establish fiduciary duties that
lawyers owe to their clients. Perhaps in part for these reasons, few
subsequent criminal prosecutions have been brought against lawyers
for failing to disclose a conflict of interest.65
true of opposing litigants and, even if they were, C&S was not directly adverse to the
BusTop minority investors whom Rosenman Colin represented.
63. Coffee, supra note 6, at 137.
64. Id.
65. In the early 1990s, in a case reminiscent of Bronston, the government prose-
cuted law partners, Melvin Miller and Jay Adolf, who were Speaker of the New York
State Assembly and counsel to the Speaker, respectively, on mail fraud charges. The
government alleged that, in breach of their fiduciary duties, they used confidential
client information to take advantage of an investment opportunity that might other-
wise have been available to their clients. Their convictions were overturned based on
the Supreme Court's post-Bronston decision in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350
(1987), which interpreted the mail fraud statute to apply only where there is proof of
a scheme to defraud someone of money or property. See United States v. Miller, 997
F.2d 1010, 1016 (2d Cir. 1993). The Second Circuit found that, although the defend-
ants' dealings "may not have been a model of candor and disclosure," they had not
committed the crime of mail fraud, because they had not been proven to have de-
prived their clients of money or property within the meaning of the mail fraud statute
as interpreted in McNally. See id. at 1023.
More recently, a highly publicized prosecution, resulting in a criminal conviction,
was brought against John Gellene, a New York lawyer, for making false statements
relating to his law firm's conflict of interest in a bankruptcy proceeding. See Karen
Donovan, John Gellene Sentenced to 15 Months, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 10, 1998, at A6; Anna
Snider, Milbank Ex-Partner Convicted of Fraud: Firm Faces $100 Million Malpractice
Suit, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 4, 1998, at Al. Gellene was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 152(3),
which proscribes "knowingly and fraudulently mak[ing] a false declaration" in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, based on allegations that he made false filings to conceal that his
firm, while representing the debtor in Chapter 11 proceedings, had also represented a
creditor. It is unclear whether this prosecution posed the same dangers as Bronston.
Insofar as the gravamen of the charge was that Gellene deliberately made false state-
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B. Criminal Law and the Standard of Conduct for Lawyers
Criminal law defines the standard of conduct for lawyers both di-
rectly and indirectly. First, it may establish standards of conduct inde-
pendently of the disciplinary norms. Additionally, it may influence
the development of disciplinary standards.
1. Defining the Standard of Conduct
Criminal law may play a role not only in encouraging compliance
with professional norms that happen to coincide with the dictates of
criminal law, but in establishing professional norms by proscribing
conduct that might otherwise be professionally permissible. u' For ex-
ample, in the nineteenth century, the norms governing lawyers' busi-
ness relations with clients and prospective clients were established in
part by the common-law crimes of champerty, barratry, and mainte-
nance.67 Current examples include criminal provisions, typically mis-
demeanors, governing the unauthorized practice of law and the
solicitation of clients. Although these provisions are most often en-
forced against nonlawyers, who are beyond the reach of lawyer disci-
plinary codes and the lawyer disciplinary process, they apply to
lawyers as well. Other criminal law provisions, although not specifi-
cally directed at legal practice, nonetheless may bear on how lawyers
conduct their work. For example, federal money laundering statutes
ments of fact in a court filing, the theory of this prosecution would not seem to pres-
ent the issues that made Bronston controversial. However, the prosecution's theory
appears to have been that Gellene's filings were false in that they contained material
omissions-namely, that they omitted disclosure of his law firm's "connections" to the
creditor. One might view the omission not as a false factual assertion that the law
firm had no connection with any creditor, but as an erroneous legal assertion to that
effect. Ordinarily, lawyers may assert any legal position that is not frivolous. See, e.g.,
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(2) (1981) (stating that a law-
yer shall not knowingly advance a claim or defense which is not warranted under
existing law and which cannot be supported by a good faith argument for extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law). Further, a lawyer who asserts a frivolous
legal position is ordinarily subject to judicial or disciplinary sanctions, not criminal
sanctions. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1997) (providing that an attorney may be sub-
ject to disciplinary action for willfully asserting a frivolous legal question). To the
extent that the gravamen of Gellene's offense was that he impliedly asserted an erro-
neous, and ultimately frivolous, legal position to the effect that his firm's relationship
with a particular creditor was not a connection that had to be disclosed under the
bankruptcy rules, the criminal prosecution might seem to involve a danger of
overcriminalization.
66. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., The Law and Ethics of Lawyering 57-75 (2d
ed. 1994) [hereinafter Hazard et al., Ethics of Lawyering].
67. See Wolfram, supra note 62, at 489-90; Max Radin. Maintenance by Chain-
perty, 24 Cal. L. Rev. 48 (1935); Percy H. Winfield, The History of Maintenance and
Champerty, 35 L.Q. Rev. 50 (1919).
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restrict lawyers' fee-arrangements and other financial dealings with
clients.68
When criminal laws apply to lawyers' professional conduct, criminal
prosecutors may give effect to them directly by invoking them as the
basis for prosecuting a lawyer or by various indirect means that may
require the lawyer to defend against an accusation of criminal wrong-
doing. For example, the criminal law may justify a criminal investiga-
tion of a lawyer that does not eventuate in the filing of criminal
charges, because the allegations against the lawyer prove to be inade-
quately substantiated or entirely unfounded, 69 because the lawyer
agrees to assist in a criminal investigation of clients or other third par-
ties in exchange for leniency,70 or because the prosecutor simply de-
cides as a matter of discretion not to bring charges. Alternatively,
during a criminal investigation of the lawyer's client or former client,
the prosecutor may present allegations that a lawyer assisted a client
in criminal wrongdoing as a ground for seeking the lawyer's disclosure
of otherwise privileged information under the crime-fraud exception
to the attorney-client privilege or work-product privilege.71 The pros-
ecutor may also present such allegations in support of a motion to
disqualify the lawyer from representing a criminal defendant. 72 In
68. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (1994); see generally Hazard et al., Ethics of Lawy-
ering, supra note 66, at 74 (discussing the effects of legislative enactments aimed at
organized crime and drug trafficking on lawyer behavior).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Van Engel, 15 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that
an investigation of the defendant's lawyer, although unwarranted, was not a proper
ground for dismissing the indictment). For a further discussion of this case, see infra
notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Committee on Prof' Ethics v. Mollman, 488 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 1992)
(suspending an attorney who, in exchange for the government's agreement not to
prosecute him on drug charges, secretly tape-recorded a conversation with a former
client).
71. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d 653, 661 (10th Cir. 1998) (de-
termining that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applied in the
present case and, thus, that the district court properly held that the attorneys must
testify "as to any act, communication, document or other matter" concerning the par-
ties' relationships (citation omitted)). The prosecution does not need to establish that
the lawyer intentionally assisted the client's criminal conduct, and so, a court's appli-
cation of the crime-fraud exception does not necessarily mean that the lawyer acted
criminally. See id. at 660. On the other hand, the crime-fraud exception may be estab-
lished by showing that, although the client was innocent, the lawyer acted criminally.
See In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
72. The prosecutor may argue that, in light of the allegations, the lawyer has an
interest in currying favor with the prosecution, at the expense of the client. If the
allegations involve wrongdoing together with the particular defendant, then the pros-
ecutor may also argue that the lawyer's defense may be adversely influenced by the
lawyer's interest in suppressing evidence of the lawyer's own wrongdoing. See, e.g.,
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 136 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[I]t is
unrealistic for this court to assume that Zepp's attorney vigorously pursued his cli-
ent's best interest entirely free from the influence of his concern to avoid his own
incrimination."); United States v. Salinas, 618 F.2d 1092, 1093 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding
that the trial judge may disqualify a retained attorney where the judge believes the
attorney is the target of an investigation concerning the events for which he was in-
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none of these contexts is the impact of the criminal law as severe as
when the lawyer faces criminal prosecution. Nevertheless, even ab-
sent prosecution, the accusations may cause the lawyer to experience
anxiety, incur cost and expend time in defending his conduct, and suf-
fer harm to his professional reputation and, as a consequence, his
livelihood.
A criminal provision that sets a standard of lawyer conduct may
have force even if it is not invoked by criminal prosecutors. Criminal
prosecutions are only rarely brought against lawyers for violating so-
licitation laws,73 but such violations may serve as a ground for disbar-
ment.' Similarly, lawyers are only rarely prosecuted for engaging in
unauthorized practice of law by practicing law outside the jurisdiction
in which they are licensed,75 but the criminal provision may serve as
the basis for disciplining,7 6 enjoining,' or, as in a well-publicized Cali-
fornia case last year, denying legal fees to lawyers who violate an un-
authorized practice provision.7" And, as Professor Perillo discusses in
dicted); In re Investigation Before Feb., 1997, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652,
656-57 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating that a lawyer was properly disqualified from represent-
ing a criminal defendant because of suspicions of his involvement in wrongdoing);
United States v. Kerlegon, 690 F. Supp. 541, 544-46 (W.D. La. 1988) (disqualifying a
criminal defendant's attorney where the attorney was a subject of the investigation
that led to the defendant's indictment, because of the risk that the attorney's self-
interest would influence his conduct of plea negotiations and other aspects of the
representation). With respect to disqualification motions in criminal cases, see gener-
ally Bruce A. Green, Her Brother's Keeper: The Prosecutor's Responsibility When
Defense Counsel Has a Potential Conflict of Interest, 16 Am. J. Crim. L 323 (1989)
(exploring the responsibilities of prosecutors when criminal defense lawyers have con-
flicts of interests); Bruce A. Green, "Through a Glass, Darkly": How the Court Sees
Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 Colum. L Rev. 1201 (1989) (ar-
guing that the Supreme Court's decision on pretrial disqualification was inconsistent
with its prior decisions on conflicts of interest).
73. A highly publicized example was the South Carolina prosecution of John
O'Quinn, an extremely well-known and successful Texas personal injury lawyer, relat-
ing to his alleged role in soliciting clients in connection with a USAir crash. Both the
solicitation charge and a fee-splitting charge were ultimately dismissed against
O'Quinn and two other defendants in exchange for their guilty plea to the charge of
practicing law in the state without a South Carolina license. See Susan Borreson, So
What? The Bar's Out Topple to Tort King John O'Quinn for Chasing Cases. Why
Don't His Clients Give a Dann?, Tex. Law., Mar. 9, 1998, at 1.
74. See, eg., State Bar v. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1994) (disbarring
attorneys for an isolated act of solicitation).
75. See supra note 73 (noting the recent guilty plea of personal injury lawyer John
O'Quinn).
76. See, e.g., In re Washington, 489 A.2d 452, 453 (D.C. 1985) (disciplining a law-
yer for practicing law outside of the state in which he was licensed).
77. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Kaiser, 397 So. 2d 1132, 1134 (Fla. 1981) (enjoining a
lawyer from placing advertisements in a state in which he was not licensed).
78. See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949
P.2d 1, 13 (Cal. 1998). The New York law firm in this case had represented a Califor-
nia corporation, ESQ Business Services, Inc., ("ESQ") and its principals for a number
of years, including in connection with an agreement allowing Tandem Computers to
distribute software created by ESQ. See id. at 3. The agreement provided for disputes
to be arbitrated and governed by California law. See id. at 2-3. In 1993, a dispute
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his contribution to this special issue, to the extent that champerty laws
remain in effect, they are not often enforced criminally, but may be
enforced in civil lawsuits to justify a denial of attorneys' fees.7 9 In
these ways, lawyers may be encouraged to comply with the standards
set by criminal law, even if not as strongly as if there were a serious
risk of criminal prosecution.
The Tenth Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Singleton,8"
although short-lived, illustrates how professional norms established by
criminal law (if only inadvertently) may have force even if prosecutors
publicly take the position that the law is inapplicable to the conduct in
question. In that case, the government, through a federal prosecutor,
entered into a guilty plea agreement providing that if the defendant
testified truthfully against his co-defendant, then the government
would support his motion for a reduced sentence.81 The court found
that the prosecutor's promise constituted a bribe in violation of fed-
eral law and that, to deter official misconduct, the remedy would be
the exclusion of the cooperating defendant's testimony.8"
In some cases, the legislature may consider it to be a matter of indif-
ference whether the criminal provision defining a standard of profes-
sional conduct is enforced at all, because the legislature's intent is
primarily to make a public statement of some nature. For example, as
Dean Griswold once described, in the early years of the republic, a
number of states adopted statutes making it a crime for lawyers to cite
English law that post-dated July 1, 1776.83 One might suppose that
the motivation was less to influence lawyers' conduct than to express
hostility to England. In other contexts, just as the legal profession
expresses its understandings in part through civility codes and other
aspirational statements that are not meant to be enforced, the legisla-
ture, as a body representing the public, may express through the crimi-
nal law its own understandings-or counter-understandings-about
how lawyers should conduct themselves. One illustration is a Mary-
arose under the agreement and the law firm was hired to resolve the dispute by both
the New York corporation and by a sister corporation of the same name that was
incorporated in California. See id. at 5. In addition to performing work in New York,
lawyers from the firm held some meetings in California and filed an arbitration claim
in California, eventually settling the case before an arbitration was held. See id. at 3.
In the context of a subsequent fee dispute between the sister corporations and its
lawyers, the California Supreme Court held that the New York law firm could not
collect its fee for work performed within California's borders because its lawyers had
violated a misdemeanor provision forbidding persons who were not members of the
California state bar from practicing law in the state. See id. at 13.
79. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyers' Contracts is Different, 67 Fordham
L. Rev. 443, 474 (1998).
80. 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), vacated on grant of reh'g en banc, July 10, 1998.
81. See id. at 1344.
82. See id. at 1359-61.
83. See Erwin N. Griswold, Law and Lawyers in the United States: The Common
Law Under Stress 13 (1964) (citing statutes from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
Kentucky).
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land criminal law, enacted in 1996 and struck down that same year on
constitutional grounds, restricting a lawyer's use of the mail to solicit
clients in cases involving crimes or traffic offenses. s' The state legisla-
ture may have fully expected the law to be struck down but neverthe-
less considered it important to express public hostility to lawyers'
solicitation of clients in criminal cases.
2. Influencing the Drafting of Professional Norms
Criminal law influences the content of disciplinary codes.s Several
bases of criminal liability have been particularly significant. Most im-
portant are the principles of accomplice liability and conspiracy under
which lawyers may be criminally liable for intentionally assisting cli-
ents or agreeing with clients to commit a crime." Additionally, of
special relevance to lawyers in an adversary role are crimes relating to
obstruction of justice, such as those dealing with witness tampering,s7
witness bribery,' subornation of perjury, 9 contempt of court,90 and
obstruction of justice generally.91
In response to concern about lawyers' potential criminal liability,
the lawyer codes encourage lawyers to comply with criminal laws that
are especially likely to bear on their professional conduct or, in the
very least, the lawyer codes make it possible for lawyers to do so. This
is most evident in disciplinary provisions that incorporate criminal law
by reference. Some of them are designed to prevent lawyers from
assisting clients in criminal and other wrongdoing. For example, the
ABA Model Rules require lawyers to withdraw from a representation
84. See Ficker v. Curran, 950 F. Supp. 123 (D. Md. 1996); see also Babkes v. Satz,
944 F. Supp. 909, 914 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (enjoining the enforcement of a Florida crimi-
nal law that proscribed the solicitation of clients based on information regarding traf-
fic citations contained in public records).
85. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 1 cmt. b (Proposed
Final Draft No. 2, 1998) ("The lawyer codes draw much of their moral force and, in
many particulars, the detailed description of their rules from preexisting legal require-
ments and concepts found in the law of torts, contracts, agency, trusts, property, reme-
dies, procedure, evidence, and crimes.").
86. See id § 8 cmt. e.
87. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (1994) (forbidding corrupt attempts at witness
persuasion and "knowingly us[ing] intimidation or physical force, threatenling] ... or
engag[ing] in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to influence...
the testimony of any person").
88. See, e.g., id § 201(a)(3) (making it a crime to "corruptly give[ 1, offer[ ], or
promise[ ] anything of value to any person ... with intent to influence the testimony
under oath or affirmation of such ... person as a witness").
89. See, e.g., id- § 1622 (making it a crime to "procure[ ] another to commit any
perjury").
90. See, e.g., id § 402 (forbidding "willfully disobeying any lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command of any district court of the United States...").
91. See e.g., id § 1510(a) (making it a crime to "willfully endeavor[ ] by means of
bribery to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to a
violation of any criminal statute of the United States by any person to a criminal
investigator").
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that will result in a violation of criminal or other law' and to disclose
material facts to the court or to a third person where "necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal ... act by the client." 93 Other disciplinary
provisions require advocates to comply with obstruction-of-justice
laws. Thus, the Model Rules forbid lawyers from "unlawfully ob-
struct[ing] another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter[ing],
destroy[ing] or conceal[ing] a document or other material having po-
tential evidentiary value,"94 "offer[ing] an inducement to a witness
that is prohibited by law,"95 or "seek[ing] to influence a judge, juror,
prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law."96
Other disciplinary provisions, although not incorporating criminal
law by reference, essentially codify restrictions that exist in the crimi-
nal law. Examples in the ABA Model Rules include provisions for-
bidding a lawyer from knowingly making false statements to the
court,9 7 offering false evidence,98 or "counsel[ing] a client to engage,
or assist[ing] a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal
.... 9"I Examples in the predecessor ABA Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility include rules forbidding lawyers from "advis[ing]
or caus[ing] a person to secrete himself... for the purpose of making
him unavailable as a witness," 100 compensating a witness "contingent
upon the content of his testimony or the outcome of the case," 10 1 or
"threaten[ing] to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advan-
tage in a civil matter." 102 It is unclear to what extent these provisions
are more restrictive than the criminal law. Insofar as disciplinary pro-
visions simply incorporate or codify criminal law proscriptions, they
serve primarily to remind lawyers what the law requires and to allow
discipline of lawyers who fail to comply.
With respect to certain areas of professional conduct, the criminal
law has influenced the development of disciplinary rules that are un-
questionably more restrictive than the criminal law and that are
designed to prevent lawyers from engaging in practices that may lead
to criminal conduct. For example, the ABA Model Rule dealing with
safekeeping client property requires lawyers to separate funds belong-
ing to a client or third party from those of the lawyer.103 Commingling
client and personal funds would not otherwise be wrongful in itself,
92. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16(a)(1) (1995).
93. Id. Rules 3.3(a)(2), 4.1(b).
94. Id. Rule 3.4(a).
95. Id. Rule 3.4(b).
96. Id. Rule 3.5(a).
97. See id. Rule 3.3(a)(1).
98. See id. Rule 3.3(a)(4).
99. Id. Rule 1.2(d).
100. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-109(B) (1981).
101. Id. DR 7-109(C).
102. Id. DR 7-105(A).
103. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 9-102; Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct Rule 1.15(a).
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but when lawyers commingle funds, they are more susceptible to the
temptation to misappropriate client funds. The purpose of the rule is
thus "to ensure that client funds are used only on the client's behalf
and not for the lawyer's personal or business purposes"' " in violation
of criminal law. By defining an area of professional conduct that is
forbidden by the disciplinary rule but not the criminal law, the rule by
design establishes precisely the "penumbra" to which Professor Cof-
fee has referred.
Finally, some disciplinary rules authorize lawyers to avoid assisting,
or appearing to assist, a client's criminal conduct, even at the expense
of the client's interests. For example, the ABA Model Rules allow a
lawyer to withdraw from representing a client if "the client persists in
a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer rea-
sonably believes is criminal"1 5 or if "the client has used the lawyer's
services to perpetrate a crime or fraud."1 6 The confidentiality rules
in many states, such as New York, allow a lawyer to disclose "[tihe
intention of a client to commit a crime and the information necessary
to prevent the crime,"1 7 to disclose client confidences to the extent
necessary to defend against a criminal charge,1m1 and to withdraw the
lawyer's previous written or oral opinion or representation that might
be relied on by a third party when the lawyer learns that the opinion
or representation is being used to further a crime."° Although these
provisions serve various ends, an important one is to permit risk
avoidance by lawyers.
What these provisions allow lawyers to avoid is the risk of errone-
ous accusations. In situations in which the lawyer's assistance was un-
witting, and therefore innocent, the lawyer may nevertheless be
subject to investigation and prosecution, because the prosecutor may
erroneously infer that the lawyer knew of the client's criminal conduct
and intentionally assisted in it. In order to protect themselves, then,
lawyers are permitted (though not required) to withdraw from the
representation or to disclose client confidences under certain circum-
stances in which they might otherwise appear to have joined with their
clients in committing crimes.
C. The Role in the Licensing Process
The commission of certain crimes has traditionally been a possible
ground for a court to deny an individual a license to practice law,' or
104. Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 237 (3d ed. 1996).
105. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16(b)(1).
106. Id Rule 1.16(b)(2).
107. New York Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(C)(3)
(1990).
108. See id DR 4-101(C)(4).
109. See id DR 4-101(C)(5).
110. See, eg., State ex reL Ayamo v. State Bd. of Governors of Wash. State Bar
Ass'n, 167 P.2d 674, 676 (Wash. 1946) (denying an Indiana lawyer admission to prac-
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to suspend or revoke a lawyer's license to practice law.11' Conse-
quently, the criminal law plays a role in the attorney licensing process.
Criminal conduct that occurs in connection with a lawyer's profes-
sional practice may be a ground for disbarment or other professional
discipline for obvious reasons. Professional discipline is principally in-
tended to protect the public from individuals who will engage in im-
proper professional practices. A lawyer who has acted wrongfully
and, indeed, criminally, in the course of law practice might be ex-
pected to do so again in the future.
Courts deem certain criminal conduct to be relevant to an individ-
ual's fitness to practice law, however, even where it occurred outside
the individual's legal practice. For example, President Richard Nixon
was disbarred for failing to answer disciplinary charges relating to the
allegations of obstructing justice that had led to his resignation from
the presidency.11z In some cases, disciplining lawyers for criminal con-
duct outside the practice of law can be justified on the theory that
certain wrongdoing demonstrates a deficiency in traits of character,
such as honesty, expected of a lawyer. Traditionally, the commission
of only certain "infamous" crimes or crimes involving dishonest con-
duct or "moral turpitude" was thought to reflect adversely on one's
qualification for law practice. 1 3
tice law in Washington because he had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in
violation of Washington's criminal law).
111. See, e.g., Slemmer v. Wright, 6 N.W. 181, 182 (Iowa 1880) (suspending a law-
yer following a guilty plea to the charge of making false statements to clients in order
to defraud them of funds); In re McCarthy, 51 N.W. 963, 963 (Mich. 1879) (involving a
disbarment following a guilty plea to the charge of obtaining money under false pre-
tenses); Ex parte Brown, 2 Miss. (1 Howard) 303, 306-07 (Miss. 1836) (holding that
falsifying documents, which is criminal conduct, is grounds for disbarment). See gener-
ally Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 5(g) (Proposed Final Draft
No. 2, 1998) ("An act constituting a violation of criminal law is also a disciplinary
offense when the act either violates a specific prohibition in an applicable lawyer code
... or reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a law-
yer .... ").
112. See In re Nixon, 385 N.Y.S.2d 305 (App. Div. 1976); In re Nixon, 305 N.Y.S.2d
373 (App. Div. 1969). Disciplinary proceedings growing out of Watergate were
brought against approximately nine other lawyers who had been connected with the
Nixon administration. See Martin Garbus & Joel Seligman, Sanctions and Disbarment:
They Sit in Judgment, in Verdicts on Lawyers 47, 47 (Ralph Nader & Mark Green
eds., 1976).
113. See Exparte Burr, 4 F. Cas. 791, 794 (C.C.D.C. 1823) (No. 2186) (stating that a
court may disbar a lawyer convicted of highway robbery, larceny, forgery, "other infa-
mous crime," or "grossly dishonest conduct," because "the purity of the administra-
tion of justice demands that the bar should be pure and honest"); In re Fahey, 505
P.2d 1369, 1376 (Cal. 1973). See generally John S. Bradway, Moral Turpitude as the
Criterion of Offenses that Justify Disbarment, 24 Cal. L. Rev. 9, 19-22 (1935) (arguing
that courts have found no principles to determine which crimes involve "moral turpi-
tude" and that the concept should therefore be abandoned as the basis for distinguish-
ing crimes for which disbarment is a proper sanction); Donald T. Weckstein,
Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession, 48 Tex. L. Rev. 267,
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Many courts now consider a wider range of criminal conduct to be
relevant on the theory that lawyers are, in a sense, legal (if not moral)
exemplars and must therefore abide by the criminal law.'14 This the-
ory reflects an observation made by the Supreme Court more than a
century ago when it affirmed an order disbarring a lawyer who had
participated in a lynch mob. The Court noted that "[olf all classes and
professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws,"
and that a lawyer's criminal conduct "sets a pernicious example" and
"manifests a want of fidelity to the system of lawful government which
he has sworn to uphold and preserve."' 5 Consistent with this ration-
ale, it might be thought that the commission of virtually any crime
(and certainly any involving intentional wrongdoing) casts doubt on
one's professional qualifications. The ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, however, do not subject a lawyer to professional disci-
pline for all criminal conduct outside the context of legal practice.
They allow discipline only if the "criminal act.., reflects adversely on
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects.""' 6 This limiting concept is not substantially clearer than the
"moral turpitude" concept that it supplants.
Although a court may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose criminal
conduct is proven independently in a disciplinary proceeding,1 7 for
the most part courts rely on criminal convictions as proof that a law-
yer or applicant for a law license committed a crime. Some state stat-
utes provide for the automatic disbarment of a lawyer who is
convicted of certain crimes.1 ' Whether or not disbarment necessarily
results, disciplinary proceedings are generally initiated following a
lawyer's criminal conviction. Thus, by convicting a lawyer of a crime,
a prosecutor increases the likelihood, and sometimes all but guaran-
tees, that the lawyer-defendant will be denied the right to continue
practicing law for at least some time, if not permanently.
The extent to which criminal law ought to have collateral conse-
quences in the lawyer licensing context has drawn some attention in
276 (1970) (arguing that the concept of "'moral turpitude' .. . is both too vague and
too broad to be effectively employed as a standard for professional discipline").
114. See St. Pierre's Case, 304 A.2d 88, 89 (N.H. 1973); In re Krogh, 536 P.2d 578,
589-90 (Wash. 1975).
115. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 274 (1882).
116. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(b) (1995). The ABA Model
Rules also provide for discipline for specified criminal conduct relating to law prac-
tice. See supra Part I.B.2.
117. See, eag., In re Friedman, 609 N.Y.S.2d 578, 586-87 (App. Div. 1994) (disbar-
ring an attorney for intentionally dishonest conduct).
118. See, e.g., N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(4)(b) (McKinney 1983) (providing for automatic
disbarment upon the conviction of a crime that would be classified as a felony under
state law).
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the academic and professional literature. 119 Commentators have
questioned whether the commission of a crime is a reliable predictor
of future professional misconduct and, to the extent it is not, whether,
to promote the image or integrity of the legal profession, it is legiti-
mate to deny an individual admission to the bar or suspend or disbar a
lawyer because of the commission of a crime. 2
For purposes of this Article, the more important question is
whether, and in what way, a criminal prosecutor should take the col-
lateral consequences of a criminal conviction into account in deciding
whether to bring charges against a lawyer.121 On one hand, an indi-
vidual's status as a lawyer may weigh against prosecution, either be-
cause, where culpability is uncertain, a lawyer ought to receive the
benefit of the doubt or because, taking into account the collateral im-
pact on the individual's livelihood, a criminal conviction would be un-
deservedly harsh and justice would be adequately served by
professional discipline. On the other hand, an individual's status as a
lawyer may be viewed as a factor weighing in favor of prosecution,
because wrongdoing by one in a position of public trust may be taken
more seriously, because it may be important to avoid the appearance
that those with higher professional status (particularly one shared by
the prosecutor) are treated more leniently than others, or because of a
perceived need to compensate for the limitations of the disciplinary
process. As discussed later, the question of how to account for the
potential defendant's status as a lawyer has particular significance in
cases in which the lawyer's questionable conduct might be defended
on the basis of professional norms.122
119. See Bradway, supra note 113, at 23 (arguing that a disciplinary sanction should
be available where criminal conduct "has lowered the prestige of the legal profession
and rendered less efficient the administration of justice").
120. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94
Yale L.J. 491, passim (1985) (arguing that a criminal conviction does not necessarily
predict future professional misconduct and that the force of the legal profession's
regulatory process "should be conserved for acts bearing directly on professional
practice"); Weckstein, supra note 113, at 279 (questioning the validity of the assump-
tion that a lawyer's criminal conduct outside of the practice of law "tends to show a
disposition to violate the rules of society, which might find expression in his profes-
sional affairs").
121. A criminal conviction may have any number of collateral consequences. For
example, under immigration law, a conviction may lead to the deportation of a nonci-
tizen defendant. Or, a conviction may result in debarring a corporation from doing
business with the government or debarring an individual from engaging in a regulated
business, such as securities trading. In many cases, prosecutors take collateral conse-
quences such as these into account in making decisions about whether to bring crimi-
nal charges, what charges to bring, and what plea bargain to enter, although there is
no professional consensus about how they should be weighed.
122. See infra Part IV.
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II. THE TENSION BETWEEN CRIMINAL LAW AND OTHER
PROFESSIONAL NORMS
In many situations in which criminal law serves a regulatory role,
the criminal law is consistent with professional norms derived from
other sources. This is most especially true of criminal provisions that
have the effect of protecting lawyers' clients, as in the case of laws
forbidding the misappropriation of client funds or fraudulent billing.
It may, however, also be true of provisions protecting third parties or
the adjudicative process. Consider, for example, the criminal law in
issue in the prosecution of Clarence Darrow-the law forbidding the
bribery of jurors. Although, in his day, Darrow may have believed
that bribing jurors in certain cases was proper as a matter of social,
political, or personal morality," m even Darrow could not have de-
fended this conduct based on professional norms, either as they were
then understood or as they should be understood. Bribing jurors or
assisting others in doing so on behalf of a client is a professionally
impermissible distortion of the adjudicative process.
In some situations, however, there is a tension between the criminal
law and professional norms derived from other sources. In the rare
case, this occurs because the criminal law proscribes conduct that
would otherwise be not only encouraged, but required by professional
norms. An illustration is a 1996 federal law, 124 recently held unconsti-
tutional,"z which would subject lawyers, among others, to imprison-
ment for up to five years if they receive a fee for counseling or
assisting elderly clients in lawfully transferring assets in order to meet
the poverty levels to become eligible for Medicaid. Lawyers retained
by older clients seeking legal advice about their financial plans would
be required to refrain from explaining how disposing of assets in cer-
tain legally permissible ways would affect the client's eligibility for
Medicaid. This law is at odds with professional norms governing cli-
ent counseling. The legal profession's ethical codes express the under-
standing that lawyers should counsel clients fully concerning legal and
non-legal aspects of decisions about which their clients seek advice.1"6
123. See Cowan, supra note 24, at 438-40. For a discussion of the tension between
personal values and professional norms, see generally Bruce A. Green, The Role of
Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 19 (1997)
[hereinafter Green, Personal Values].
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (1994). For a discussion of this law and the organ-
ized bar's opposition to it, see Dean S. Bress. Now the Lawyer is the Criminal, N.Y. St.
B.J., Dec. 1997, at 43.
125. See New York State Bar Ass'n v. Reno, 999 F. Supp. 710 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
126. See, e.g., Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-8 (1981) (-A lawyer
should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only after
the client has been informed of relevant considerations.... Advice of a lawyer to his
client need not be confined to purely legal considerations."); Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct Rule 1.4(b) (1995) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation."); see also Eleanor M. Crosby & Ira M. Leff, Ethical Considerations in
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One might view this criminal provision as evidence of what Susan
Koniak describes as the ongoing battle between the state's law and
professional legal ethics.'27 In this instance, the Attorney General de-
clined to defend the constitutionality of the criminal statute and, thus,
the bar prevailed.
In most cases, however, the tension between the criminal law and
professional norms derived from other sources is far less direct be-
cause the criminal law, the other professional norms, or both are un-
clear. Sometimes, the criminal law proscribes professional conduct
that would otherwise be professionally permissible, and even praise-
worthy, but does so in such an unclear way that a lawyer might under-
standably act in conformity with other professional norms. This
creates a danger of overcriminalization-that the lawyer's conduct
does not deserve criminal punishment.
Criminal provisions may also overdeter, discouraging lawyers from
engaging in lawful, praiseworthy conduct out of fear that a prosecutor
who misconstrues the conduct will launch a criminal investigation or
prosecution. The risk of prosecutorial error arises in part because the
relevant criminal provisions are fairly open-textured and because their
applicability depends primarily on the actor's (in this case, the law-
yer's) state of mind, which is generally determined inferentially. The
facts relevant to the lawyer's state of mind are likely to be disputed,
uncertain, or open to competing inferences. Thus, the outcome of a
criminal trial of a lawyer for illegal conduct will often be hard to pre-
dict. Regardless of the outcome of a trial, or even whether a criminal
prosecution is ever initiated, simply being investigated criminally is
burdensome and expensive. The mere prospect of being investigated
may therefore "chill" a lawyer from undertaking particular conduct.
The tension between the criminal law and professional norms is par-
ticularly likely to arise in the context of advocacy, and especially crim-
inal defense advocacy. Criminal defense lawyers have the strongest
justification to promote their clients' interests in accordance with an
expansive concept of "zealous advocacy," yet are the likeliest subjects
of a criminal investigation when they do so, both because their ques-
tionable conduct is especially likely to be known to a prosecutor and
because a prosecutor is likely to feel most aggrieved by a criminal
defense lawyer's apparent misconduct. The result is that, especially
for criminal defense lawyers, the criminal law may serve indirectly to
restrain conduct that might otherwise be considered professionally
praiseworthy.
Medicaid Estate Planning: An Analysis of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1503, 1511-12 (1994) (discussing the importance of assuring
that clients are well-informed about all options and their implications regarding asset
divestiture and Medicaid eligibility).
127. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. Rev.
1389, 1390-91 (1992).
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Two sets of examples are discussed below, the first arising out of the
criminal law relating to accessorial liability, and the second growing
out of obstruction-of-justice provisions.
A. Accessorial Liability
The criminal law of accessorial liability generally forbids a lawyer
from intentionally assisting a client in committing a crime.'2 The pro-
fessional norms appear to be consistent with the criminal law, inas-
much as the ethical rules forbid a lawyer from knowingly assisting a
client in the commission of a crime. 129 There may nevertheless be a
tension between the professional norms and the criminal law regard-
ing accessorial liability. Certainly, lawyers themselves profess to per-
ceive such a tension, as reflected in some lawyers' response to several
highly publicized prosecutions of Miami criminal defense lawyers,
some of whom were former federal prosecutors, for allegedly assisting
members of the Cali drug cartel. According to the ABA Journal, the
indictments "sent shock waves throughout the defense bar, and left
many wondering where good lawyering ends and criminal activity be-
gins."130 The cries of alarm arose again some time later when two of
the lawyers who had gone to trial were convicted of some, although
not all, of the charges.'
One aspect of this perceived tension reflects a difference between
how the criminal law and the lawyer codes might be understood to
answer the question of when a lawyer becomes an accomplice or, in
the language of federal criminal law, an "aider and abetter," by giving
legal advice, drafting documents, making court appearances, or pro-
viding other law-related assistance to individuals engaged in ongoing
criminal conduct. Under the criminal law, one is generally liable as an
accomplice for giving any kind of assistance or encouragement-even
standing by silently ready to give some aid if needed 132 -if one acts
with the intent to promote the crime. Under one construction, an in-
dividual may be criminally liable even if his purpose is not to assist the
crime, if he knows his conduct will have that effect.133 Further, under
128. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 8 cmt. e (Proposed
Final Draft No. 2,1998).
129. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(d).
130. Henry J. Reske, Defense Lawyers Fear Impact of Cali Case: Attorneys' Indict-
ment for Aiding Drug Clients Could Chill Advocacy, Critics Claim, A.B.A. J., Sept.
1995, at 16, 16.
131. See Mireya Navarro, Lawyers Weigh Effect of Conviction of Missing Colleague,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1998, § 1, at 24.
132. See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 6.7(d) (2d ed.
1996).
133. See id.; see also Darryl Van Duch, Lawyers Called Conspirators, Nat'l L...,
Aug. 17, 1998, at A6 (describing indictments of hospitals' lawyers who allegedly
drafted consulting agreements between the hospitals and nursing home executives
knowing that the agreements involved illegal bribes, rather than legitimate consulting
fees).
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the criminal law, "knowledge" may be established by showing that the
defendant ignored his suspicions and "consciously avoided" the truth
about another's wrongdoing.13 4 Thus, in some jurisdictions, a pawn-
broker may be liable as an accessory to a murder if he sold a gun with
reason to know that the purchaser sought it for that use, even if the
pawnbroker's only purpose was to make a sale.135
In contrast, when certain ethical rules speak of the obligation to
avoid assisting a client in the commission of a crime, they may be un-
derstood to contemplate affirmative assistance in aspects of the cli-
ent's conduct that are wrongful (e.g., in planning the crime or drafting
fraudulent documents), while permitting the rendition of services that
do not in themselves directly promote the client's criminal ends. Fur-
ther, when these restrictions speak of the lawyer's knowledge of a cli-
ent's wrongdoing, they may be understood to contemplate that the
lawyer possesses either first-hand knowledge or an admission of guilt
by the malefactor.136 Many lawyers understand that some degree of
conscious avoidance is permitted, if not essential to effective
advocacy. 13
7
The tension between criminal law and professional legal ethics with
respect to accessorial liability may arise in any number of situations.
For one, consider a story told about Earl Rogers, the turn-of-the-cen-
tury California criminal defense lawyer who represented Darrow in
his first bribery trial. One day, according to Rogers's daughter, a well-
heeled gentleman entered Rogers's office and asked the price of a de-
134. See United States v. Wilson, 134 F.3d 855, 868 (7th Cir. 1998).
135. See LaFave & Scott, supra note 132, at § 6.7(d).
136. See In re Grievance Comm. of U.S. Dist. Court, Dist. of Conn., 847 F.2d 57, 63
(2d Cir. 1988); State v. Skjonsby, 417 N.W.2d 818, 825-28 (N.D. 1987); see generally
Wayne D. Brazil, Unanticipated Client Perjury and the Collision of Rules of Ethics,
Evidence, and Constitutional Law, 44 Mo. L. Rev. 601, 609 (1979) (arguing that a
lawyer should not conclude that a client is engaging in wrongdoing absent "com-
pletely indisputable" proof); Monroe H. Freedman, But Only If You "Know," in Ethi-
cal Problems Facing the Criminal Defense Lawyer 135-41 (Rodney J. Uphoff ed.,
1995) (stating that a high degree of knowledge about a client's conduct is required for
punishment). But see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting
a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. Miami L. Rev. 669, 675, 682 (1981)
(citing authority that, for purposes of the ethical rule forbidding a lawyer from know-
ingly assisting a client in illegal or fraudulent conduct, "liability results from actual
knowledge of the client's illegal purpose, but also that it results from knowledge of
facts that reasonably should excite suspicion").
137. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 109-10, 119
(1990) [hereinafter Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics] (criticizing two approaches to the
problem of client perjury-"selective ignorance" and the "Roy Cohn Solution" which
involves "knowing while not knowing"); Kenneth Mann, Defending White-Collar
Crime 104-11 (1985) (describing white-collar defense attorneys' techniques for avoid-
ing knowledge of their clients' criminal conduct). But see Standards Relating to the
Admin. of Criminal Justice, The Defense Function Standard 4-3.2(b) (1991) ("De-
fense counsel should not instruct the client or intimate to the client in any way that
the client should not be candid in revealing facts so as to afford defense counsel free
rein to take action which would be precluded by counsel's knowing of such facts.").
[Vol. 67
CRIMINAL REGULATION OF LAWYERS
fense for murder. Upon receiving his answer, the gentleman counted
out the fee in gold and started for the door. When asked why he was
leaving, the client replied that he was going off to "kill the man now"
and then would "be back." Was Rogers, by his willingness to defend
the client, guilty of assisting the murder? If so, what of a criminal
defense lawyer who indicates a willingness to defend members of an
ongoing criminal organization who are arrested or indicted? The gov-
ernment has taken the position that a lawyer who thus serves as
"house counsel" for a criminal organization, as it alleged that Bruce
Cutler did for the Gambino Crime Family, is criminally culpable as a
co-conspirator, although it has only sought Cutler's disqualification
but never prosecuted him on this theory. 13 The much-loved, albeit
fictional barrister, Horace Rumpole, would seem to play the same role
for the Timson family of petty thieves,139 thus raising the question of
whether a United States prosecutor would bring charges against
Rumpole as an accessory to the Timsons.
As a matter of professional ethics (viewed independently of the
criminal law), the lawyers in these examples are likely to conclude
that, as long as they do not advise their clients about how to commit
crimes or avoid capture, but simply provide a vigorous courtroom de-
fense, they may represent the future (and, in some cases, former)
criminals. Thus, in Rogers's case, although knowing first-hand of the
client's intention to commit a murder, Rogers would not have been
assisting in the crime merely by making himself available thereafter to
render a courtroom defense. Further, in the case of the alleged
"house counsel" to a criminal organization, it might be argued that as
long as the lawyer is not privy to the organization's planned future
crimes, the lawyer lacks sufficiently specific "knowledge" that his will-
ingness to wage a defense on behalf of a later-accused individual will
assist the organization in future criminal activity.
Yet, under ordinary criminal law principles, it might appear to be a
crime to render an otherwise legitimate defense, or even to make one-
self available to do so, when the defense lawyer is on notice that doing
so may indirectly aid the individual or his organization in future
138. See United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 932-33 (2d Cir. 1993). Allegations
that a lawyer served as "house counsel" for a criminal organization typically center on
the assertion that the lawyer was paid by a higher-up in the organization to represent
a lower-level employee. See id.; United States v. Gotti, 9 F. Supp. 2d 320 (S.D.N.Y.
1998).
139. See John Mortimer, Rwnpole and the Summer of Discontent, in The Third
Rumpole Omnibus 269, 290 (1998) ("Fred [Timson] was the undoubted chief of the
Tmsons, that large clan of South London villains who, by their selfless application to
petty crime, had managed to keep the Rumpoles in such basic necessities of life as
sliced bread, Vim, ChAteau Fleet Street and the odd small cigar."); John Mortimer,
Rwnpole and the Tap End, in The Third Rumpole Omnibus 111, 112 (1998) ("1 have
spoken elsewhere, and on frequent occasions, of my patrons the Timsons, that ex-
tended family of South London villains for whom, over the years, I have acted as
Attorney-General.").
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crimes by giving them some confidence that if caught, they may es-
cape through the lawyer's skillful defense. For members of an ongo-
ing criminal conspiracy (e.g., a drug cartel, a gambling ring, or an
organized crime family), obtaining an arrested member's release on
bail or acquittal, thus enabling him to avoid punishment for prior
criminal acts and resume criminal conduct, might be a plausible object
of the conspiracy. A lawyer who wages a vigorous defense, knowing
that the criminal conspirators are seeking to secure his client's release,
might seem thereby to become a co-conspirator himself, since he is
acting with knowledge of the conspiracy and in furtherance of one of
its aims. Indeed, one might say that the lawyer intends to further one
of the conspiracy's objectives, although the reason that this is so is that
his own objective as a defense lawyer simply happens to coincide with
this objective of the conspiracy. The lawyer's knowledge of the crimi-
nal conspiracy and his intent to join generally will not be proven di-
rectly, but circumstantially from proof of the facts made known to the
lawyer and the lawyer's conduct. Once it is inferred that the lawyer
acted with criminal intent, all his otherwise lawful acts, such as investi-
gating the case for trial or filing motions, would seem to become acts
in furtherance of the conspiracy. Indeed, that is how the government
apparently conceptualized its prosecution of defense lawyers who had
represented members of the Cali cartel. According to a federal prose-
cutor responsible for the case, once the defense lawyers joined the
conspiracy, anything they did was in furtherance of it. 4
In addition to allowing the possibility of punishing lawyers crimi-
nally for professional conduct that seems proper when viewed exclu-
sively through the lens of professional ethics, the criminal law of
accessorial liability discourages lawyers from lawful professional con-
duct in order to avoid unintentionally and unwittingly assisting in a
crime. In this respect, the criminal law is in tension with professional
norms that generally favor assisting individuals with their legal
problems. Suppose, for example, that a client with questionable inten-
tions asks the lawyer's advice. The professional norms encourage law-
yers to advise clients concerning the lawfulness of their future
conduct, even recognizing that the clients may then opt to act unlaw-
fully. 4' The Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit that, if the
140. See Navarro, supra note 131, at 24.
141. Model Rule 1.2 cmt. 6 states:
A lawyer is required to give an honest opinion about the actual conse-
quences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct. The fact that a
client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent does
not, of itself, make a lawyer a party to the course of action. However, a
lawyer may not knowingly assist a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct.
There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects
of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or
fraud might be committed with impunity.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2 cmt. 6 (1995); cf. Professional Ethics
Comm. of the Fla. Bar, Op. 90-1 (1990) (opining that where a criminal defendant
[Vol. 67
CRIMINAL REGULATION OF LAWYERS
client chooses to transgress, "[the lawyer] may continue in the repre-
sentation of [the] client ... so long as [the lawyer] does not thereby
knowingly assist the client to engage in illegal conduct ...."142 Or,
suppose that the lawyer suspects that a client seeking assistance in
drafting legal documents intends to commit a crime. For example,
there may be reason to suspect that the client intends to defraud his
counterpart in a business transaction, to collect on an insurance policy
by making false submissions to the insurer, or to lie on an application
for an immigration. Although disciplinary rules would not require the
lawyer to represent the client, some lawyers might understand that
professional norms encourage doing so where the lawyer's suspicion is
unconfirmed. First, there is a general understanding that those in
need of legal assistance should have access to lawyers.1 43 Addition-
ally, there is a professional understanding that lawyers are generally
entitled to believe a client, to give a client the benefit of the doubt, or
to be agnostic about the truth or falsity of the client's account, at least
in the absence of extraordinarily compelling evidence that the client is
acting unlawfully.11
In these examples, the criminal law strongly discourages a lawyer
from assisting a client's questionable conduct or from giving advice to
a client who may subsequently act criminally. If the lawyer lends
assistance, and it turns out that the client was engaged in criminal con-
duct or subsequently commits a crime, then the lawyer should not be
criminally culpable, because the lawyer's state of mind would have
been innocent. Yet, viewing the lawyer's conduct after the fact, a
prosecutor may suspect that the lawyer knew of the client's intent to
commit a crime and may therefore initiate an investigation or even
commence a prosecution. The prosecutor is unlikely to receive a com-
reveals an intent to flee the jurisdiction, experience teaches and ethics requires that
rather than disclosing the client's intent to the court, the law yer should instead at-
tempt to persuade the client to appear in court as required).
142. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-5 (1981).
143. See, e.g., Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 1-1 ("A basic tenet of
the professional responsibility of lawyers is that every person in our society should
have ready access to the independent professional services of a lawyer of integrity and
competence."); id. EC 7-18 ("The legal system in its broadest sense functions best
when persons in need of legal advice or assistance are represented by their own
counsel.").
144. See, e.g., Hazard & Hodes, supra note 55, § 3.3:201, at 581 (allowing lawyers to
give their clients the benefit of the doubt in matters that are not known to be false);
cf. Ultramares v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444-49 (N.Y. 1931) (stating that a lawyer has
no independent duty to be suspicious of the client for the benefit of non-clients).
Although it might be argued that this understanding is deluded or that it is applied
only in the context of advocacy, or perhaps only in the context of criminal defense
advocacy, many non-litigators undoubtedly share this understanding moreover, the
obligations of loyalty, confidentiality and zealous representation from which it derives
are not limited to courtroom lawyers. Cf Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 137,
at 66 (noting that all clients are entitled to "warm zeal" in the promotion of their
interests).
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plete and accurate version of what took place. Indeed, the prosecutor
may receive false evidence from the now-former client in exchange for
leniency. In any event, what the Restatement terms "the divide be-
tween appropriate counseling and criminal activity" '145 is an indistinct
one which turns on the lawyer's information, and the lawyer's past
state of mind and level of knowledge can be determined only inferen-
tially. Prosecutors may be unduly likely to draw the most negative
inferences for any of several reasons, including that they are occupa-
tionally disposed to be suspicious or skeptical and that they perceive
criminal defense lawyers to be adversaries rather than professional
brethren. The criminal process does not invariably check
prosecutorial prejudices. Even if it receives an accurate account of
the lawyer's conduct, a grand jury applying a "probable cause" stan-
dard, and even a jury applying a "reasonable doubt" standard, may
infer erroneously that the lawyer, in whom the client might have been
expected to confide, had full knowledge of the client's criminal wrong-
doing, when in reality the lawyer had but a suspicion. Thus, criminal
law principles of accomplice liability might encourage a lawyer to re-
fuse lawfully to assist a client who is suspected of wrongdoing in order
to avoid the possibilities of being investigated, prosecuted, and per-
haps even wrongfully convicted.
B. Obstruction of Justice
The tension between criminal law and other sources of professional
norms pervades the work of advocates. On one hand, the predomi-
nant ethic of "zealous advocacy" is understood to permit, and some-
times even require, a lawyer to promote the client's ends without
regard to the ultimate justness of the client's cause as, for example,
when a lawyer defends a guilty client in a criminal trial.146 In the pro-
cess of doing so, it is understood that a lawyer (other than a govern-
ment lawyer) may deliberately engage in certain conduct that seems
calculated to mislead the fact-finder. For example, a criminal defense
lawyer may argue to the jury that his client is innocent, even though
he knows the client to be guilty, or cross-examine a truthful witness to
make it appear that she is untruthful.1 47 Further, as Monroe Freed-
man has pointed out, it may be difficult to draw a principled distinc-
tion between this adversarial conduct which is almost universally
deemed professionally acceptable and other conduct in advocacy, such
as presenting perjured testimony, which most lawyers and judges,
145. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 8 cmt. b (Proposed Fi-
nal Draft No. 2, 1998).
146. See generally Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 137, at 13-42, 65-86
(describing the adversary system and the ethic of zealous representation).
147. See id. at 163.
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although not Freedman himself,1 48 consider to be invariably
unethical.
149
On the other hand, criminal laws protect against deliberate efforts
to undermine the truth-seeking process. Criminal provisions specifi-
cally proscribe destroying, falsifying or secreting evidence, secreting
witnesses, or influencing witnesses to testify falsely, but the bounda-
ries of the relevant law are ill-defined. For example, federal law
makes it a crime to "corruptly... [endeavor] to influence ... obstruct,
or impede, the due administration of justice."'' 0 This is an inchoate
crime: The individual need not actually "obstruct" but need only "en-
deavor" (that is, attempt) to do so. Further, the obstruction of "the
due administration of justice" (unlike, say, the obstruction of the IRS
in its collection of income taxes) involves interference wvith an abstract
process in ways that are neither defined nor delimited by the statute.
The mental element provides no greater clarity or limitation. Courts
have held that "corruptly" means to act with the purpose of ob-
structing justice, that it is enough if the obstruction of justice is a rea-
sonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's act and not his
main purpose, and that the corrupt intent may be inferred from the
circumstances.' 5' As applied to criminal defense lawyers, it is unclear
what difference there is between the purpose of obstructing justice,
which the criminal law proscribes, and the purpose of discouraging the
prosecution or securing the acquittal of a guilty client for a fee, which
is considered professionally praiseworthy.
The crime of obstruction applies even to generally lawful acts un-
dertaken in furtherance of the forbidden objective of obstructing jus-
tice. For example, a lawyer who puts evidence in a drawer with the
intent to safeguard it until it must be produced presumably would not
be guilty of obstruction, while a lawyer who engaged in the same con-
duct with the intent of hiding the evidence permanently from criminal
investigators probably would be. Because the criminal law itself does
not draw a line between proscribed and permissible conduct in de-
148. See id. at 120 (arguing that when a client decides to testify falsely, despite
being advised not to do so, "the lawyer should go forward in the ordinary way," that
is, "the lawyer should examine the client in the normal professional manner and
should argue the client's testimony to the jury in summation to the extent that sound
tactics justify doing so"); id. at 123-24 (observing that he would put the defendant's
spouse or parent on the stand to corroborate the defendant's false testimony if he
could not dissuade them from falsely testifying).
149. See id at 164. Freedman asserts that both in presenting the defendant's per-
jured alibi and impeaching the truthful victim, a lawyer participates in misleading the
finder of fact with the aim of freeing a guilty defendant and that the difference in
practical effect is that the lawyer takes a less active role when eliciting the defendant's
false testimony than when attacking the witness in cross-examination. He suggests
that the distinction made by critics of the former practice turns on their deontological
understanding that lying is wrong while cross-examination is good. See id.
150. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994).
151. See United States v. Machi, 811 F.2d 991, 996 (7th Cir. 1987).
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fense of a guilty client and allows a lawyer to be prosecuted for engag-
ing in conduct that is innocent on its face, or susceptible to an
innocent explanation, if his intent is "corrupt," a criminal defense law-
yer might plausibly be accused of endeavoring to obstruct justice
when he acts in virtually any way to secure the acquittal of a client
who committed the crime charged. 152 For example, a lawyer's motion
to suppress evidence or his advice to the client to assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege would appear to be calculated to deprive the
fact-finder of relevant, inculpatory evidence. A lawyer's cross-exami-
nation of a truthful witness may be designed to induce the witness to
give an erroneous account of relevant events. One might respond that
no reasonable prosecutor would think to bring charges against a law-
yer for acts such as these, which are commonly understood to be con-
sistent with the due administration of justice and possibly required by
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. As
noted earlier, however, in prosecuting Miami lawyers who had de-
fended members of the Cali drug cartel, the government professed
that even commonplace aspects of a criminal defense become acts of
obstruction if the lawyer possessed "corrupt" intent.153
The criminal law may influence lawyers' understanding of the
bounds of legitimate advocacy not only by clearly proscribing certain
conduct, but also by its ambiguity.'54 For example, Monroe Freedman
describes commentators' belief that a lawyer would be committing the
crime of subornation of perjury if he were to call as a witness a client
or third party whom the lawyer knows will testify falsely. 55 Professor
Freedman believes that these commentators misinterpret the law and
that the lawyer acts lawfully as long as he has discouraged the witness
from testifying falsely.156 Although Professor Freedman may be right,
a lawyer who knowingly presents false testimony runs the risk of being
investigated or prosecuted by a prosecutor who interprets the criminal
law differently, who does not know that the lawyer counseled the wit-
ness against taking the stand and lying, or who receives false testi-
mony from the witness to the effect that the lawyer encouraged and
helped fashion the false testimony. Thus, even if one were otherwise
152. Cf Morgan v. United States, 309 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (holding that
neither Congress nor the Supreme Court intended to "include traditional trial tactics
within the statutory terms 'conceals or covers up').
153. This was also the government's theory in United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620
(7th Cir. 1998), discussed infra at part III.A.
154. Lawyers may also take steps to reduce the risk that legitimate advocacy will
later be misperceived by the prosecution because prosecution witnesses (typically,
former clients) misconstrue, misremember, or deliberately lie about the lawyer's con-
duct. See, e.g., Joseph B. Cheshire V, Ethics and the Criminal Lawyer: The Perils of
Obstruction of Justice, Champion, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 12, 12 (listing suggestions for
avoiding the problem of prosecution witnesses who "misconstrue or misinterpret the
defense counsel's conduct or comments during an interview").
155. See Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 137, at 122-23.
156. See id.
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convinced by Freedman's argument that, independent of the criminal
law, the optimal professional response to the problem of a client who
insists on testifying falsely is both to present the false testimony and to
rely on it in summation, the ambiguous criminal law might lead one to
a different understanding.
This example and three other sets of illustrations offered below sug-
gest that, in the hands of aggressive prosecutors, the criminal law
could come to have a profound influence not only on how advocates
for private parties, and especially criminal defense lawyers, act in spe-
cific ways within the confines of existing professional norms, but on
how the legal profession in general comes to understand the profes-
sional role of an advocate. The vigorous advocacy of criminal defense
lawyers on behalf of guilty clients is generally accepted even by those
who might consider equal devotion to the questionable ends of private
clients unacceptable in the civil context. ' There is room to debate
the implications of this role, however, both for the content of profes-
sional norms and for how lawyers should act where existing norms are
unclear. One plausible conception, with which Monroe Freedman is
associated, would place greater weight on client confidentiality and
zealous advocacy, even where the interests of an accurate fact-finding
would be compromised in the individual case. A competing concep-
tion would emphasize candor to the tribunal and the immediate inter-
ests of the truth-seeking process. 158 Although lawyers have
considerable discretion "to construct a philosophy of legal practice
within the porous construct of professional norms,"' 59 criminal law
has the potential to make untenable the most robust conception of
zealous advocacy by forbidding or strongly discouraging lawyers from
acting in accordance with such a conception.
1. Dealing with Documents and Physical Evidence
How should advocates deal with documents or physical evidence
that may be relevant to a civil lawsuit or criminal prosecution but that,
if revealed, will undermine the client's legal position or other inter-
ests? Under obstruction-of-justice provisions, it may be a crime to
conceal or destroy documents that are relevant to a criminal or civil
proceeding or to cause someone else to do so.Y6' A line of judicial
decisions has held that obstruction provisions may require lawyers
voluntarily to preserve incriminating physical evidence or writings, to
alert the state to their existence, or to produce them to the state, even
157. See David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 197-201 (1988);
David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different? 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1729, 1756 (1993);
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L Rev. 589, 605-
06 (1985).
158. See Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Unipireal View, 123 U. Pa. L
Rev. 1031 (1975).
159. Green, Personal Values, supra note 123, at 56.
160. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1510(a), 1512(b)(2)(A)-(B) (1994).
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absent a court order, legally enforceable discovery request, or proce-
dural rule explicitly requiring disclosure.16'
Yet, the ethic of zealous advocacy counsels against preserving or
disclosing harmful materials. Absent a law or court order affirma-
tively requiring such disclosure, the lawyer representing a party to liti-
gation ordinarily has no ethical duty to disclose information that is
contrary to the client's legal position.16 Further, disclosing contrary
evidence without the client's consent may itself be professionally im-
proper in the absence of an affirmative legal or ethical duty of disclo-
sure. The lawyer's duties of zealous advocacy and confidentiality may
preclude the lawyer from disclosing information that the client seeks
161. See In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 369 (E.D. Va.), affd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir.
1967); Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200, 1211-12 & n.18 (Alaska 1978); People v. Supe-
rior Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 158 (Ct. App. 1987). See generally Standards Relating to the
Admin. of Criminal Justice, The Defense Function Standard 4-1.6 (1991) (addressing
the conduct of defense counsel upon receiving physical evidence); Abraham
Abramovsky, A Case for Increased Confidentiality, 13 Fordham Urb. L.J. 11, 25-26
(1985) ("Once a client shows incriminating evidence to a lawyer, the lawyer becomes
obligated to advise the client to surrender it to him so that he may deliver it to the
authorities."); Deborah Abramovsky, A Case for Increased Disclosure, 13 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 43, 59-60 (1985) ("[I]f a lawyer is asked by the court to explain the circum-
stances under which he came to possess [incriminating] evidence, he is ethically bound
to assert the attorney-client privilege and refuse to answer."); Norman Lefstein, In-
criminating Physical Evidence, the Defense Attorney's Dilemma, and the Need for
Rules. 64 N.C. L. Rev. 897 (1986) (examining the need for rules governing the disclo-
sure of incriminating physical evidence); James N. Bostic, Comment, A Criminal De-
fense Attorney's Duty to Produce Damaging Physical Evidence: It Is Not as it Seems,
1987 Det. C.L. Rev. 819 (1987) (proposing requirements for criminal defense attor-
neys to produce damaging physical evidence); Jane M. Graffeo, Note, Ethics, Law,
and Loyalty: The Attorney's Duty to Turn Over Incriminating Physical Evidence, 32
Stan. L. Rev. 977, 998 (1980) (suggesting that the "states adopt a rule providing a
limited evidentiary privilege allowing attorneys to possess incriminating physical evi-
dence under certain conditions").
162. See, e.g., Brown v. County of Genesee, 872 F.2d 169, 175 (6th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that in settlement negotiations, counsel for the defendant in an employment dis-
crimination case had no duty to correct the plaintiff's mistaken belief about the rate of
pay to which she would have been eligible had she been hired); Kerwit Med. Prods.,
Inc. v. N. & H. Instruments, Inc., 616 F.2d 833, 837 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that the
plaintiff's lawyer had no duty to disclose facts from which a defense could be fash-
ioned); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.1 cmt. 1 (1995) ("A lawyer is
required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's behalf, but generally has
no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts."); New York
County Lawyers' Association, Formal Op. 309 (1933), in Olavi Maru & Roger L.
Clough, Digest of Bar Association Ethics Opinions 217 (1970) (stating that defend-
ant's counsel may move to dismiss negligence claim for lack of proof without disclos-
ing the existence of an eyewitness, unknown to the plaintiff, who would testify to the
unproven element of the claim). See generally Wolfram, Legal Ethics, supra note 62,
at 639-40 (observing that "[a] general operating principle for American litigators is
that evidence known to them is private and proprietary .... [Njeither lawyer nor
client is under any obligation to come forward unbidden with information that is un-
known to the other side, even if the other side will surely lose its case in the absence
of knowledge of that evidence" (citations omitted)).
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to keep confidential and that, if disclosed, would undermine the~cli-
ent's cause.
1 63
While the lawyer may believe that the "zealous advocacy" principle
justifies withholding evidence that would be harmful to the client's
case, a prosecutor who later examines his conduct may conclude
otherwise, as a Wisconsin case illustrates."M Kravit, a lawyer, de-
fended Van Engel in a civil RICO action brought by two of Van En-
gel's former business partners who charged him with insurance fraud,
embezzling funds, and other criminal conduct.16 5 At a time when fed-
eral prosecutors had expressed no interest in investigating the matter,
Kravit negotiated a settlement between his client and one of the plain-
tiffs which included a requirement that the plaintiff turn over evi-
dence, including tape recordings, on which the lawsuit had been
based.166 Shortly thereafter, a young federal prosecutor commenced
an investigation of Van Engel triggered by new allegations that Van
Engel had bribed a purchasing agent.167 Upon learning of the provi-
sion in the RICO settlement, and hearing third-hand that Kravit had
sought the tapes in order to destroy them, the prosecutor commenced
a criminal investigation of Kravit.1' Over the course of the two-year
investigation, which proved fruitless, the prosecutor made Kravit the
target of a sting operation, issued him a grand jury subpoena, and in-
formed others that he was a target of an investigation. 69
In subsequent decisions dealing with criminal charges brought
against Van Engel, both the federal district court10 and the Seventh
Circuit'7 ' criticized the prosecutor for investigating Kravit. The ap-
pellate court explained that the settlement provision that had excited
the prosecutor's suspicions was common in civil RICO cases and that
it was unclear in any event whether, before a criminal investigation of
Van Engel had begun, the obstruction provisions would have forbid-
den Kravit from intentionally destroying evidence.'" Yet, there had
been no procedural means by which a court could have terminated the
criminal investigation. Further, one might imagine that Kravit's ulti-
mate judicial vindication was cold comfort after having endured a
two-year criminal investigation with its attendant anxiety and cost.
Thus, the lesson of the case is not unambiguous. On one hand, a law-
yer might view the investigation of Kravit as aberrational and be en-
couraged by the investigation's denouement to engage in borderline
163. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof. Responsibility, Formal Op. 387 (1994).
164. See United States v. Van Engel, 15 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1993).
165. See hiL at 626.
166. See id. at 627.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 627-28.
170. See United States v. Van Engel, 809 F. Supp. 1360, 1369-70 (E.D. Wis. 1992).
171. See United States v. Van Engel, 15 F.3d 623, 627-28 (7th Cir. 1993).
172. See id. at 627-28.
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conduct. 173 On the other hand, a cautious lawyer might derive the
lesson that his own interests, if not those of the client, may be best
served by avoiding conduct that, although lawful, could be miscon-
strued as an attempt to conceal or destroy incriminating material.1 74
2. Misleading Advocacy
In the context of courtroom advocacy, there is a similar tension be-
tween criminal laws that protect the integrity of the truth-seeking
function and professional norms relating to zealous advocacy. A law-
yer's statements or conduct designed to mislead the court, jury, or op-
posing counsel may violate obstruction or fraud provisions or
constitute criminal contempt of court.175 Yet, the professional norms
173. See Kenneth Mann, Defending White Collar Crime 153-55 (1985). Mann
presents various examples of borderline conduct undertaken by white-collar criminal
defense lawyers. As an example of aggressive conduct in dealing with incriminating
documents, Mann discusses a criminal investigation of a company that produced a
product that injured a high number of users. See id. After receiving a grand jury
subpoena for all records of tests or opinions about the product's effects, safety, and
side effects and any other information related to product testing "done by" or "acted
on" by the company, the company reviewed its files and found a set of very damaging
reports by an independent lab issued before the product was manufactured. See id.
The reports showed that materials used in the product caused the precise negative
effects that the product allegedly caused. See id. Although the subpoena was broadly
worded, the corporation's counsel decided not to produce the reports on the dubious
legal theory that they were not called for by the subpoena because they were not
"done by" the company but by an independent lab and were not "acted on" by the
company but ignored. See id. The conduct Mann describes reflects a professional un-
derstanding that, as an aspect of zealous advocacy, lawyers should resolve legal uncer-
tainties in their clients' favor.
174. Other cases suggesting the virtue of caution include Commonwealth v.
Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114, 126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), and People v. Sandy, 666 N.Y.S.2d
565, 569-70 (App. Div. 1997). The latter case involves the prosecution of David
Sandy, a London solicitor, based on professional conduct undertaken in Abu Dhabi
on behalf of citizens of that country with an interest in the Bank of Credit and Com-
merce International (BCCI). The three-count indictment, charging Sandy with con-
spiracy and evidence tampering, alleges that he retrieved and removed material
contained on computer disks stored in an Abu Dhabi office in order to prevent their
discovery by an accounting firm which might in turn have produced them to New
York prosecutors who were then engaged in a grand jury investigation of BCCI, See
Sandy, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 567. Although a trial court dismissed the indictment based on
an absence of evidence that Sandy's conduct had a materially harmful impact in New
York State, the intermediate appellate court overturned its ruling and allowed the
prosecution to continue, finding that there would be sufficient evidence to allow a jury
to infer that Sandy "intended and knew that his actions were interfering with the
production of evidence before a sitting grand jury," and that, consequently, "the cir-
cumstances of this case present the archetype of a criminal offense for which extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction is designed." Id. at 568. The implication of the court's ruling is
that the dictates of New York criminal law govern the professional conduct of English
solicitors when they are engaged in the representation of Abu Dhabi clients in Abu
Dhabi, without apparent regard for the possibility that proscribed conduct may be
consistent with professional norms applicable to lawyers in England or Abu Dhabi
(or, for that matter, New York) relating to zealous advocacy and client confidentiality.
175. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 9 F.2d 990, 991 (D. Mont. 1925) (holding that
the lawyer's presentation of false evidence constituted contempt of court).
CRIMINAL REGULATION OF LAWYERS
contemplate that lawyers may sometimes act misleadingly in order to
serve the client's interests.1 76
Consider, for example, a Washington lawyer named Thoreen whose
client in a criminal trial was accused of violating an injunction against
salmon fishing.177 Hoping that government witnesses would be unable
to identify the client, Thoreen directed the defendant to dress in a
business suit and sit in the area of the courtroom ordinarily reserved
for the press, then placed at counsel table a look-alike dressed in out-
door clothing.7 8 After the ruse was revealed, and the trial concluded,
Thoreen himself was tried and convicted of criminal contempt.17 9 In
upholding the conviction, the Ninth Circuit interpreted criminal con-
tempt of court to include "conduct inappropriate" to a lawyer's role
that obstructs the administration of justice.'80
Like the Bronston case, the criminal contempt prosecution initiated
by the district court in Thoreen was predicated on the lawyer's pur-
ported disciplinary violation. Both the trial and appellate courts cited
disciplinary rules forbidding deceitful conduct, the creation of false
testimony, and the failure to comply with known customs or practices
of the court to establish the inappropriateness of Thoreen's con-
duct.18' These rules, together with an informal bar association opin-
ion, were said to have put Thoreen on notice that his proposed
conduct was professionally improper."s Yet, none of the disciplinary
provisions explicitly addressed Thoreen's ruse, and Thoreen might
have derived the opposite conclusion from other evidence of the pro-
fessional norms.
As courts have noted, lawyers' professional conduct is guided by
"the lore of the profession" as well as the lawyer codes."-' The profes-
sional lore glorifies criminal defense lawyers who engage successfully
176. In their treatise on the ABA Model Rules, Professors Hazard and Hodes give
the example of a lawyer defending a criminal defendant who is guilty of a robbery: At
trial, although the defense lawyer is aware that the robbery took place at 2:00 p.m.,
the victim testifies unequivocally that the crime occurred at 4:00 p.m., a time for which
the defendant has a truthful and unshakeable alibi. A Michigan bar association ethics
committee has opined that, under these circumstances, there would be no ethical im-
pediment to presenting the alibi testimony, "even though it plainly had the potential
to mislead the trier of fact"-a conclusion which, the commentators conclude, -is
clearly correct" because "the case does not involve presentation of false evidence by
the defense lawyer." Hazard & Hodes, supra note 55, § 3.3:210, at 596.1 (citing Michi-
gan State Bar Comm. on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Op. Cl-1164).
177. See United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1981).
178. See id.
179. See id at 1337.
180. Id. at 1339.
181. See id at 1338-41.
182. See id at 1342.
183. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 (1985) (reasoning that specific gui-
dance for the professional standards of a lawyer is provided by case law, court rules,
and custom); In re Finkelstein, 901 F.2d 1560, 1564-65 (11th Cir. 1990) (same); Howell
v. State Bar, 843 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1988) (same).
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in trickery of various sorts. For example, Earl Rogers became legen-
dary not only, and perhaps not primarily, for his forensic skill and
medical knowledge, but for his inventiveness and deviousness. The
tale is told of how Rogers successfully defended a man accused of
stealing a horse from a prosperous farmer by replacing the defendant
at counsel table with a similarly dressed confederate, thereby causing
the farmer to make a misidentification.184 Had he heard this tale,
Thoreen might have believed that his misleading conduct, later held to
be proscribed by the open-textured criminal contempt statute, was
professionally acceptable, and even admirable, as a matter of zealous
representation. Assuming that, in hindsight, Thoreen's conduct was
wrongful and deserved to be sanctioned, it is doubtful whether it was
worthy of being sanctioned criminally, rather than by professional dis-
cipline. Further, given the high price paid by Thoreen, a cautious law-
yer might hesitate not only to switch the defendant with a look-
alike,' 85 but also to employ other misleading tactics, even if more de-
fensible, in order to stay far clear of the criminal law. 18
6
More recently, Patrick Hallinan, a well-regarded criminal defense
lawyer from San Francisco, was prosecuted unsuccessfully for alleg-
edly committing crimes in service of a client, Mancuso, who was said
to be a Nevada drug kingpin."8 7 One charge, which was dismissed
184. See Alfred Cohn & Joe Chisholm, Take the Witness 40-41 (1934).
185. Not all lawyers have done so, however. See United States v. Sabater, 830 F.2d
7, 8 (2d Cir. 1987); People v. Simac, 641 N.E.2d 416, 421-22 (Ill. 1994).
186. A decision that might be similarly chilling is State v. Casby, 348 N.W.2d 736
(Minn. 1984), which upheld a lawyer's misdemeanor conviction for attorney miscon-
duct where, acting on behalf of a criminal defendant who had falsely identified him-
self at the time of his arrest, the lawyer negotiated with the prosecutor without
disclosing the client's fraud. The opinion suggested that, insofar as the lawyer sought
to preserve the client's confidences, she had little choice but to withdraw from the
representation, because "it is difficult to see how [she] could have continued to repre-
sent [the client], even under the most passive conditions, without the danger of assist-
ing the client's fraudulent conduct and preserving false evidence .... Id. at 739.
Independent of the criminal law, lawyers might plausibly conclude that professional
norms permit, and even encourage, the lawyer to continue the representation as long
as the lawyer does not affirmatively perpetuate the client's fraud. See Eva S. Nilsen,
Disclose or Not: The Client with a False Identity, in Ethical Problems Facing the Crim-
inal Defense Lawyer 214, 225 (Rodney J. Uphoff ed., 1995) (discussing National As-
sociation of Criminal Defense Lawyers Op. 90-2). The risk of criminal prosecution,
however, strongly discourages relying on this understanding of the professional
norms. See id. at 223 (opining that "[a]lthough counsel can point to constitutional
considerations as justification for nondisclosure of a client's true identity, cases such
as Casby ... make it clear that continued representation of a client with a false name
presents potentially serious problems for defense counsel"); see also William Talley,
Jr., Setting the Record Straight: The Client with Undisclosed Prior Convictions, in Eth-
ical Problems Facing the Criminal Defense Lawyer 194, 207 (Rodney J. Uphoff ed.,
1995) (opining that, where the client has undisclosed prior convictions, given cases
such as Casby, "it may be unwise for a lawyer to do anything but ask to withdraw
from representation in those instances where the court poses a direct inquiry to the
lawyer about the client's prior record").
187. See John W. Keker & Steven A. Hirsch, Partisan Arguments, Recorder, Jan.
29, 1996, at 6, 6.
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before trial, reportedly alleged that Hallinan had obstructed justice in
part by making false statements at Mancuso's bail hearing.' s These
included Hallinan's arguments that the Government would be unable
to prove that Mancuso committed any criminal acts within the appli-
cable statute of limitations, that the indictment alleged a "great
sweeping" conspiracy that included individuals unrelated to Mancuso,
and that Mancuso was not a flight risk because upstanding profession-
als in the community would attest to his having engaged in legiti-
mately-financed construction projects in the community." 9 Under the
professional norms, it might be considered proper for a lawyer to
make arguments such as these even if he disbelieves them, since the
arguments would not be taken as representations of fact concerning
matters within the lawyer's personal knowledge. Like a criminal de-
fense lawyer's jury summation arguing for the acquittal of a client
whom he knows to be guilty, these statements would instead be
viewed as assertions of the client's legal position or of conclusions that
arguably should be drawn from the facts put before the court. The
prosecution's view that a criminal defense lawyer may be criminally
liable for making such assertions if he knows them to be false suggests
that, as interpreted by the government, the obstruction provision is at
odds with conventional professional understandings.
Although the charge against Hallinan was dismissed, the line be-
tween legitimate and unlawful arguments to the tribunal remains ob-
scure. John Keker, who successfully defended Hallinan, has argued
that criminal defense lawyers may therefore be chilled from making
legitimate arguments by the possibility of being prosecuted based on
statements made in the context of advocacy. 190 Keker acknowledges
that some false statements may be wrongful, and therefore serve as a
basis for professional discipline, but he asserts that the additional risk
of prosecution at the hands of one's opposing counsel (who lacks the
disinterestedness of a disciplinary agency) will lead lawyers to be ex-
cessively timid in making arguments. 9 1
3. Relations wvith Witnesses
The tension between criminal obstruction provisions and profes-
sional norms may also arise when advocates deal with witnesses. An
earlier article examined the example of a criminal defense lawyer
dealing with an unrepresented wvitness who might provide testimony
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id Apparently recognizing the problem, Congress recently amended 18
U.S.C. § 1001-which makes it a crime to make a false statement in a matter within
federal jurisdiction-to exempt statements made by a party or a party's counsel in a
judicial proceeding. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (Supp. H 1996).
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harmful to the lawyer's client.192 The disciplinary rules could be read
to allow the lawyer to advise the witness about the possibility of as-
serting the fifth amendment privilege rather than testifying. 193 Fur-
ther, the general principle of "zealous advocacy" could be understood
to mean that a lawyer should provide such advice if doing so will pro-
mote the client's interests. 94 Yet, advising a non-client to "take the
Fifth" might constitute obstruction of justice. Even if does not, a pros-
ecutor might believe that it does and investigate or even prosecute a
lawyer who is discovered to have given this advice. 195
A similar tension might exist when representing a client who seeks
to bring a civil lawsuit against an individual who has accused the client
of criminal wrongdoing. For example, a few years ago, Archer Dan-
iels Midland Company was the subject of a federal price-fixing investi-
gation during which Whitacre, a former executive of the company,
secretly tape-recorded meetings for government investigators. While
the investigation was underway, and after the government informed
the company that it was facing imminent indictment, the company
filed civil charges against Whitacre, accusing him of embezzling mil-
lions of dollars from the company. 196 Under the disciplinary rules, a
lawyer could properly represent the company in this lawsuit as long as
it was not frivolous 197 and was not being brought solely to harass
Whitacre.' 98 Further, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
stresses that "[i]n our government of laws and not of men, each mem-
ber of our society is entitled ... to seek any lawful objective through
legally permissible means; and to present for adjudication any lawful
claim .... 199 Thus, as long as the lawsuit was colorable, and the
lawyers believed that one part of the company's motive was simply to
redress an alleged embezzlement, the lawyer codes would seem to
permit the company's lawyers to bring lawsuit and, indeed, encourage
them to do so. But, at the same time, criminal law forbids the use of
intimidation with the intent to prevent a witness from testifying.2 0 0
The corporation's lawyers might have hesitated to prosecute the law-
192. See Bruce A. Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersection of the
Ethical Codes and the Criminal Law, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 687, 690-704 (1991) [hereinafter
Green, Zealous Representation].
193. See id. at 691-98.
194. See id. at 709.
195. See id. at 699-704.
196. See Kurt Eichenwald, Archer Sues Ex-Executive Who Became U.S. Informer,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1996, Metro Section, at 45.
197. See, e.g., Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(2) (1981)
(stating that an attorney may only advance a defense that is unwarranted under ex-
isting law if there is a good faith argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law).
198. See, e.g., id. DR 7-102(A)(1) (stating that a lawyer shall not take "action on
behalf of his client when he knows ... that such action would serve merely to harass
... another").
199. Id. EC 7-1 (footnotes omitted).
200. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) (1994).
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suit against Whitacre, lest they expose themselves to a possible prose-
cution on the theory that part of their motive, as inferred from the
circumstantial evidence, was to dissuade a potential witness from testi-
fying against their corporate client.201
III. SHOULD THE CRIMINAL LAW ACCOMMODATE COMPETING
PROFESSIONAL NORMS?
When the criminal law is in tension with professional norms derived
from other sources, a question arises whether the criminal law should
accommodate the professional norms and, if so, how and to what ex-
tent. As described below, there is a range of possible approaches to
this question.
A. Discounting the Professional Norms
At one extreme, courts have sometimes considered the lawyer's sta-
tus to be essentially irrelevant, on the ground that lawyers do not have
a privilege to commit crimes. On the contrary, sounding the theme
underlying disciplinary decisions involving lawyers' criminal conduct,
it is argued that the criminal law should apply to lawyers especially
sharply because of their professional duty to be law abiding. The
opinion making this rhetorical point most strongly was United States v.
Cintolo,0 in which a lawyer was convicted of obstruction of justice
for counseling a grand jury witness to refuse to testify after receiving
immunity from the adverse use of his testimony.
On the facts presented by the government, Cintolo's conduct was
clearly professionally blameworthy, because he was acting for the ben-
efit of another client who feared the witness's testimony and contrary
to the interests of the witness himself.2"3 Nonetheless, the conviction
201. In 1990, a Virginia lawyer was tried and convicted on multiple counts of a
federal criminal indictment, including one alleging witness intimidation by filing an
apparently colorable civil complaint against a potential witness in violation of Section
1512(b). See United States v. McGough, No. 91-5511, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 28977
(4th Cir. Dec. 12,1991) (per curiam). Her conviction was upheld on appeal without a
published opinion. See id. Prior reported decisions had suggested that filing a civil
complaint would not be obstruction of justice unless the complaint was known to be
frivolous. See United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 998 (5th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Hylton, 710 F.2d 1106,1110 (5th Cir. 1983). That the complaint was frivolous, how-
ever, did not appear to be part of the prosecution's proof in the Virginia case.
202. 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1987). For a discussion of Cintolo, see Koniak, supra
note 127, at 1476-78.
203. As described in the appellate court's decision, Cintolo was the lawyer for
Angiulo, the leader of organized crime group involved in illegal gambling and loan-
sharking. When a gambler, LaFreniere, received a grand jury subpoena, Angiulo be-
came concerned that he might testify truthfully about gambling debts he incurred and
pressure to which Angiulo's subordinates had subjected him to repay overdue debts.
Angiulo pressured LaFreniere to go to jail rather than testify truthfully and enlisted
Cintolo to assist in the effort. Angiulo sent LaFreniere to Cintolo who undertook to
serve as LaFreniere's lawyer and to do Angiulo's bidding. When LaFreniere was
granted immunity and ordered to testify, Cintolo counseled him to refuse. Upon re-
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had troubling implications, because there was no obvious principle to
distinguish those cases where advising a client to decline to testify in
the grand jury would be obstruction of justice. Suppose that the client
faced a risk of prosecution and had not been granted immunity.
Would a lawyer be guilty of obstruction if, to protect the client from
incriminating himself, he advised the client not to testify in the grand
jury? Criminal liability seems unthinkable in this situation. Ordina-
rily, a lawyer would be considered inept if he failed to give this advice.
Yet, it is not obvious why the advice does not comprise obstruction of
justice, given that an aspect of the lawyer's intent is to deprive the
grand jury of relevant evidence.2°
Assume that, consistent with the contemporary understanding, the
obstruction provision does not generally forbid a lawyer from render-
ing this advice. That is, the lawyer's intent is not "corrupt" when the
lawyer's sole aim is to promote the client's penal interests. Suppose,
however, that the fees of the lawyer who gave this advice were being
paid by a third party (e.g., a corporation) that might be implicated by
the client's testimony20 5 or that the client had been referred by the
lawyer for that third party. Or, suppose that the client's testimony
might implicate a third party whom the lawyer formerly represented
or hopes to represent in the future. As in Cintolo, could the lawyer be
convicted of obstruction on the theory that he was seeking to further
the interests of a third party rather than the interests of the client?
Suppose that the client made it plain to the lawyer that the client did
not wish to implicate others and that he would rather go to jail himself
than do so or that the lawyer's motive was to protect the client from
physical retaliation by other conspirators. If the lawyer advised the
client not to testify after receiving immunity, could the lawyer be con-
victed of obstructing justice on the theory, as in Cintolo, that he was
acting contrary to the client's penal interests? The lawyer's advice in
each of these examples would have the likely effect of obstructing the
grand jury's access to truthful testimony. The only question is
whether the lawyer would be acting with "corrupt," rather than inno-
cent, intent-a question that has not been resolved by judicial deci-
sions interpreting the obstruction statute.
fusing, LaFreniere was held in contempt of court. In doing so, Cintolo was serving at
the direction of a third party without regard for the interests of his purported client.
In defense, Cintolo argued that, contrary to appearances, he was acting to serve La-
Freniere by obtaining information from Angiulo that would help in counseling his
client. However, evidence, including tape-recorded conversations between him and
Angiulo, belied this claimed innocent motivation. See Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 983-89.
204. See, e.g., United States v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1942) (upholding
lawyers' convictions for conspiring to obstruct justice based on evidence that they
took part in attempts to keep their clients from disclosing the clients' participation in
bootlegging activities to criminal investigators and the grand jury).
205. Cf. United States v. Weissman, No. S2 94 CR. 760 CSH, 1997 WL 539774
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1997) (ordering a corporation to pay its officer's legal fees in con-
nection with a criminal investigation).
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Out of concern for the implications of the prosecution, several bar
groups filed amicus briefs on appeal, supporting Cintolo's argument
that, to prevent incursions into legitimate advocacy, any facially legiti-
mate explanation for a lawyer's conduct should suffice. That is, a law-
yer should not be convicted for obstruction of justice where a possible
motivation for his conduct was innocent. The court rejected this sug-
gestion as unsupported in precedent, principle, or policy.2e Further,
it rejected the more modest defense argument that the jury should not
be permitted to infer that a lawyer acted with corrupt intent where he
performed a traditional lawyering function.2"7 The court labeled the
proposed principle as "surrealistic" and regarded it, in any event, as
irrelevant, because Cintolo was not performing a traditional lawyering
function: He was laboring to get his client into jail, rather than to
keep him out.208 Most notable was the court's strong language sound-
ing the theme that lawyers should have higher, not lower duties, 2 9
and rejecting the idea that Cintolo's conviction might "chill" legiti-
mate advocacy.210
Relying heavily on Cintolo, the Seventh Circuit recently issued an
opinion in United States v. Cueto21' that was rhetorically more re-
strained, yet more troubling in its implications. In Cueto, the court
upheld a lawyer's conviction on one conspiracy count and three ob-
struction counts for using court processes to interfere with a federal
investigation of illegal gambling operations.212 The prosecution was
predicated on traditional (although not necessarily typical) lawyering
activity-namely, civil litigation-undertaken on behalf of a client
who was the subject of a pending investigation.21 3 Cueto had been
206. See Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 990.
207. See id. at 995.
208. See id.
209. The Cintolo court wrote:
[W]e emphatically reject the notion that a law degree, like some sorcerer's
amulet, can ward off the rigors of the criminal law.... By our reckoning,
attorneys cannot be relieved of obligations of lawfulness imposed on the citi-
zenry at large.... As sworn officers of the court, lawyers should not seek to
avail themselves of relaxed rules of conduct. To the exact contrary, they
should be held to the very highest standards in promoting the cause of
justice.
Id
210. The court stated:
We have carefully examined the avowed fears .. that a decision upholding
Cintolo's conviction in this case may... somehow chill the criminal defense
bar in zealous advocacy on behalf of clients. We find such concerns to be
grossly overstated.... We see nothing to recommend the proposition that
attorneys can be of easier virtue than the rest of society in terms of the crimi-
nal code. As citizens of the Republic equal under law, all must comply with
the same statute in the same manner.
Id
211. 151 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 1998).
212. Id. at 624.
213. See id.
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retained by Venezia, the owner of a vending and amusement corpora-
tion that operated an illegal video gambling business in taverns in Illi-
nois. 14 In the course of an investigation, Robinson, an agent of the
state liquor authorities who was acting in an undercover capacity for
the FBI, solicited a bribe from Venezia.215 Venezia consulted with
Cueto and his law partner, who reported the bribe offer to the state
liquor authorities. 216 After Venezia met again with Robinson, Cueto
lodged a complaint against Robinson with the State's Attorney and
filed a state court action against Robinson on Venezia's behalf.2 17
Cueto also obtained a court order in a pending case requiring Robin-
son to show cause why he should not be enjoined from investigating
Venezia's business .2 1  After the hearing, at which Cueto elicited in-
formation from Robinson about the FBI investigation, the state court
preliminarily enjoined Robinson from interfering with Venezia's busi-
ness operations.1 9 When Robinson continued to participate in inves-
tigative activities, Cueto threatened to file a lawsuit against the liquor
authorities and fied an order seeking contempt sanctions against
Robinson.2" Now represented by the United States Attorney's Of-
fice, Robinson removed the proceeding to federal court, which va-
cated the injunction.22 ' Cueto unsuccessfully appealed the decision,
then filed an unsuccessful petition for certiorari. 222 The conspiracy
and obstruction counts were based on Cueto's efforts to use the legal
process to forestall the investigation of Venezio's business, including
by complaining to the State's Attorney, by filing motions attacking the
FBI and the United States Attorney's Office and seeking a judge's
disqualification, and by filing pleadings in the district court action as
well as the subsequent appellate brief and petition for certiorari.
In upholding Cueto's conviction, the court determined that the ob-
struction statute covers any conduct of a lawyer, including traditional
litigation-related lawyering activities such as filing colorable motions
or appeals, if the lawyer's intention is corrupt.223 It explained that the
statute was meant to cover novel and original methods of obstructing
justice in addition to those that were specifically proscribed and that
an otherwise innocent act becomes criminal if it is a step in a plot to
obstruct justice.22 4 Thus, the statute does not prohibit any particular
214. See id. at 625.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 626.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 626-27.
222. See id. at 627. See generally Venezia v. Robinson, 16 F.3d 209 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 815 (1994) (detailing the underlying facts).
223. See Cueto, 151 F.3d at 631.
224. See id.
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acts, but the corrupt endeavor. '  In this case, the court further found,
Cueto's otherwise legal conduct to defend his client comprised ob-
struction of justice because the conduct was motivated by the corrupt
endeavor to protect the illegal gambling operation and to safeguard
Cueto's own financial interest.
226
Two aspects of Cueto distinguish this case from Cintolo and bring it
far closer to a prosecution of a criminal defense lawyer who is en-
gaged in traditional advocacy. First, unlike Cintolo, who secretly
sought to further a third party's interests by advising his ostensible
client to violate his legal obligation to testify, Cueto's general conduct
as a litigator was consistent with the steps that a competent, zealous
advocate might take on behalf of a client. His acts were public and
involved the traditional tools of zealous advocacy-motions, appeals,
petitions, and the like." 7 In response to the concern that the obstruc-
tion statute provided inadequate notice of what conduct by a lawyer
on behalf of a client is proscribed, the court explained that:
As a lawyer, [Cueto] possessed a heightened awareness of the law
and its scope, and he cannot claim lack of fair notice as to what
conduct is proscribed by [section] 1503 .... More so than an ordi-
nary individual, an attorney, in particular a criminal defense attor-
ney, has a sophisticated understanding of the type of conduct that
constitutes criminal violations of the law. 228
225. See id
226. See id.
227. There are suggestions in the Seventh Circuit's opinion that some of Cueto's
court filings may have been frivolous. See id. at 633 ("The evidence demonstrates that
Cueto ... continued to file frivolous appeals .. "). There is, however, no indication
that this was an essential part of the government's proof, that the jury was charged
that it must find that the filings were frivolous in order to find Cueto guilty of obstruc-
tion, or that the court of appeals considered this necessary to justify upholding
Cueto's conviction.
Even if the court were to limit the reach of the obstruction statute to court filings
that were frivolous, concerns might be raised about the risk of chilling effective crimi-
nal advocacy. Civil sanctions for frivolous legal filings, although available in civil pro-
ceedings, are unavailable in criminal proceedings precisely because of this danger. See
United States ex reL Potts v. Chrans, 700 F. Supp. 1505, 1524 (N.D. I1. 1988) (noting
that "[i]n criminal cases [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] Rule 11 does not apply"
because "the (minimal) danger that new Rule 11 may chill creative advocacy and
impede the development of the law, though acceptable in the civil forum, make it
inappropriate in the criminal context"); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions: Case
Law Perspectives and Preventive Measures § 3.02[f] (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the ap-
plicability of Rule 11 in criminal cases). But see Young v. Ninth Judicial Dist. Court,
818 P.2d 844 (Nev. 1991) (upholding the $250 sanction imposed on a public defender
for filing a motion to strike the State's request for the death penalty in a murder trial,
where the court found no evidentiary support for the allegation that the prosecution's
decision to seek the death penalty was politically motivated). Obviously, the possibil-
ity of being punished criminally for obstruction of justice because a legal filing was
frivolous would chill legitimate advocacy to a far greater extent than the possibility of
civil sanctions.
228. Cueto, 151 F.3d at 631-32.
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But this explanation makes no sense, given the court's conclusion that
the obstruction law proscribes all professional conduct, including
"traditional litigation-related conduct," if undertaken with corrupt
intent.229
Second, unlike Cintolo, whose purpose was to promote the penal
interests of a third party at his client's expense, Cueto's purpose was
to promote his client's interests. The court nevertheless characterized
Cueto's purpose as corrupt, describing it in part as an attempt "to pro-
tect [his client] . . . from criminal prosecution""3 and elsewhere as
"the corrupt purpose of impairing, impeding, and obstructing the in-
vestigation, indictment, and prosecution of the illegal gambling and
racketeering enterprise. ' 231 The court purported to see a difference
between these impermissible purposes and a criminal defense lawyer's
legitimate "attempt to advocate his client's interests within the scope
of the law '232 and thereby "to affect the outcome of the proceed-
ings."" But, as a practical matter, either characterization could be
applied to the purposes of an ordinary white-collar criminal defense
lawyer who, in the course of representing the subject or target of a
criminal investigation, seeks aggressively, but through lawful means,
to keep abreast of the government's investigation and to protect the
client, if possible, from being indicted. The opinion suggests that what
may have distinguished Cueto from an ordinary criminal defense law-
yer was that Cueto held an indirect "personal financial interest in
[protecting] the illegal gambling operation, 2 34 so that his goal was in
part to "safeguard his [own] financial interest. 2 35 But the opinion
does not explain why, as a consequence, Cueto's purpose deviated
from that of an ordinary criminal defense lawyer who serves a client
for a fee. Cueto may have been motivated by his financial relation-
ship with Venezia, as well as by whatever fee he was receiving for his
legal services, but there is no indication in the opinion that, as a conse-
229. Elsewhere, the court observed that "[t]here is a discernable difference be-
tween an honest lawyer who unintentionally submits a false statement to the court
and an attorney with specific corrupt intentions who files papers in bad faith knowing
that they contain false representations and/or inaccurate facts in an attempt to hinderjudicial proceedings." Id. at 632. As the court construed the obstruction statute, how-
ever, the jury would not have been required to find that Cueto knowingly made false
submissions to the court or filed frivolous legal papers. On the contrary, Cueto's al-
leged acts of obstruction included filing a preliminary injunction motion that was ini-
tially victorious and a subsequent appeal after the action was removed and the state
court's order was vacated. See id. Nothing in the opinion suggests that Cueto made
any false submissions in the context of these proceedings.
230. Id. at 633.
231. Id. at 636.
232. Id. at 632.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 631. Cueto had entered into several presumably legitimate business
deals with Venezia, who funded the ventures with money from his illegal gambling
operation. See id. at 627.
235. Id. at 628.
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quence, his purpose was anything other than to defend Venezia and
his business against a possible criminal prosecution. 6
Unlike the First Circuit in Cintolo, the Seventh Circuit in Cueto did
not ridicule the possibility that the prosecution of the defendant-law-
yer would deter legitimate advocacy. It noted that the "theory of
prosecution brings us some pause" 7 and acknowledged that the ami-
cus brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
"discusse[d] valid policy concerns and assert[ed] legitimate argu-
ments"" 8 and that "it is of significant importance to avoid chilling vig-
orous advocacy and to maintain the balance of effective
representation." 9 Yet, taking the view that the paramount policy
consideration was to deter "corrupt endeavors to manipulate the ad-
ministration of justice,"2" the court offered no accommodation to the
lawyer's professional status and the professional norms. It took no
account of the danger that lawyers might be overdeterred because of
the possibility that their conduct or intentions would be misconstrued.
As in the ordinary criminal case, it trusted the jury to assess the evi-
dence, subject to limited judicial review to ensure that, "viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,"2 41 a rational
jury could have found the elements of the crime-a standard that, the
court noted, poses a "nearly insurmountable hurdle ' 242 for the de-
fendant-lawyer. Nor did the court account for the danger of
overdeterrence created by the obstruction statute's failure to draw a
clear line-or any line at all-between legitimate and proscribed acts.
It took the view that "the contours of the line between traditional
lawyering and criminal conduct... must inevitably be drawn case-by-
case,"2 43 and that "[n]othing in the caselaw, fairly read, suggests that
lawyers should be plucked gently from the maddening [sic] crowd and
sheltered from the rigors of" the obstruction statute.
B. Privileging Professional Norms
On the other end of the spectrum, courts have sometimes held that,
in light of competing professional norms, some criminal provisions
may not be invoked against a lawyer for certain conduct undertaken
236. Another fact that distinguishes Cueto's situation from that of most white-col-
lar defense lawyers is that his client's criminal conduct was not past, but ongoing.
Nothing in the opinion, however, suggests that this was an important consideration.
237. Id at 631 n.10.
238. Id. at 632.
239. I.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 630 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
242. Id. at 629 (quoting United States v. Moore, 115 F.3d 1348, 1363 (7th Cir.
1997)).
243. Id at 634.
244. Id. at 632 (quoting United States v. Cintolo. 818 F.2d 980, 993-94 (1st Cir.
1987)).
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in the course of the professional representation. The best-known ex-
ample is People v. Beige,245 the so-called "buried bodies case," in
which a lawyer representing a defendant in a murder case learned that
his client had committed other, uncharged murders.246 Based on the
client's information, Beige located and inspected the body of one of
the victims, but never disclosed its existence and whereabouts until
the trial when Beige revealed the client's other murders in the context
of an unsuccessful insanity defense.247 Beige was subsequently prose-
cuted under misdemeanor provisions of the public health law requir-
ing that a burial be accorded the dead and that a death occurring
without medical attendance be reported.248 The reporting obligation
under the misdemeanor provisions was clearly in tension with Belge's
ethical duty as a lawyer to preserve client confidences.249 Finding that
"Belge conducted himself as an officer of the Court with all the zeal at
his command to protect the constitutional rights of his client," the trial
court dismissed the prosecution principally under a provision of state
law allowing the court to do so "in the interest[ ] of justice." 2- At the
same time, however, the trial court indicated that its decision would
have been more difficult if Belge had been indicted for obstruction of
justice, rather than under what it characterized as "pseudo-criminal
statute[s]. ' 251
In other cases, the prosecution of a lawyer has been dismissed not
because the particular lawyer was found to have acted in accordance
with the dictates of professional ethics, but because the applicable
criminal statute was thought to be overbroad or vague as applied to
lawyers, in that it would reach some professionally acceptable as well
as unacceptable behavior. The most noted example is Commonwealth
v. Stenhach 2  which involved two criminal defense lawyers who, in
245. 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga County Ct.), affd, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (App. Div.
1975), affd, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976). For commentary on this case, see Jeffrey
Frank Chamberlain, Legal Ethics: Confidentiality and the Case of Robert Garrow's
Lawyers. 25 Buff. L. Rev. 211 (1975); Monroe H. Freedman, Where the Bodies are
Buried: The Adversary System and the Obligation of Confidentiality, 10 Crim. L. Bull.
979 (1974).
246. See Beige, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
247. See id.
248. See id. (citing sections 4200(1) and 4143 of the Public Health Law).
249. This was only a tension, not a direct conflict, since a lawyer in New York, as in
all other states, may disclose client confidences where "required by law or court or-
der." New York Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(C)(2)
(1996).
250. Beige, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 803. Additionally, the court suggested that the report-
ing obligation was superseded by the attorney-client privilege, which applied to the
information that the lawyer received from the client. See id.
251. Id.
252. 514 A.2d 114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); see also Hazard et al., Ethics of Lawyering,
supra note 66, at 37-47 (excerpting Stenhach as the principal case); Rodney J. Uphoff,
Introduction to Ethical Problems Facing the Criminal Defense Lawyer at xix, xix-xx
(Rodney J. Uphoff ed., 1995) (using Stenhach in part to illustrate that "the criminal
defense lawyer who makes a difficult ethical choice may also be subject to criminal
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the course of representing a defendant on murder charges, recovered
the rifle stock used in the murder and kept possession of it, errone-
ously believing it to be protected by the attorney-client privilege.3
The prosecution learned about the rifle stock through cross-examina-
tion of the defense investigator who had found it and the court then
ordered the lawyers to produce it, which they did.2-3 After the trial,
the prosecutor charged the defense lawyers with hindering prosecu-
tion and tampering with physical evidence.255 They were convicted,
but the convictions were overturned.5 6
The appellate court in Stenhach found that it was unethical for the
defense lawyers to retain the rifle stock, and that they were plainly
subject to professional discipline for having done so, 7 but that the
statutes under which they were convicted were unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad as applied to lawyers. 58 The court acknowl-
edged that, as a policy matter, exempting lawyers from the criminal
provisions will undermine the "public perception of lawyers as a posi-
tive force in the administration of justice, but will cast them in the
public mind more as accessories to crime." 9 Nonetheless, unlike the
Cintolo court, it concluded that lawyers merited different treatment
because "there is little or no guidance for an attorney to know when
he has crossed the invisible line into an area of criminal behavior. '260
The hindering prosecution statute made it a crime to conceal evidence
of a crime "with intent to hinder the ... conviction... of another for
crime," '261 while the tampering statute made it a crime to conceal a
document or thing with intent to impair its availability in an official
proceeding.262 The court observed that conduct universally perceived
as ethically proper, indeed essential, would fall within the language of
these statutes.263 For example, if the client gave the lawyer a hand-
written account of his involvement in the charged crime, the writing
would be protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege,
and the lawyer would be derelict if he gave it to the prosecutor. Yet,
failing to do so would come within the language of these statutes.
Consequently, as applied to criminal defense lawyers dealing with in-
prosecution as well as a disciplinary proceeding if someone disagrees with that
choice"); Koniak, supra note 127, at 1468-76 (discussing Stenhach).
253. See Stenhach, 514 A.2d at 116.
254. See hi
255. See id.
256. See id. at 117, 127.
257. See id. at 118.
258. See id at 125.
259. Id at 118.
260. I& at 125.
261. Id (citation omitted).
262. See id.
263. See id.
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criminating evidence, the court concluded that the statutes failed to
give clear notice of what was and was not proscribed.264
A more recent example is State v. Mark Marks, P.A.,265 in which
several individuals, including some lawyers, were charged with de-
frauding an insurance company under a Florida statute that makes it a
crime, among other things, to submit a statement in support of an in-
surance claim that contains "incomplete" information. 66 The statute
specifically makes it a felony for a lawyer to assist or conspire in such
conduct.267 The court found, however, that as applied to lawyers in
the course of representing clients, the provision criminalizing fraudu-
lent omissions was unconstitutionally vague.268 The court reasoned
that under the various laws "dealing with the atypical obligations of an
attorney in an advocate role, '2 69 lawyers owe their clients a duty of
confidentiality "which includes constraints upon information that can
be disclosed to others. ' 271 In light of the applicable authorities, law-
yers are taught that in some contexts, such as settlement negotiations,
withholding information is proper.2 7 1 Given that "less than complete
disclosure by an attorney in the representation of his or her client is
considered acceptable practice in certain instances '272 and that the
criminal statute did not distinguish between appropriate and inappro-
priate omissions, the court found that "the statute [does not] provide
adequate notice of the conduct" by lawyers that it proscribes. 73
C. A Middle Ground: Relating Professional Norms to the Fact
Finder's Determination
Some decisions recognize that the professional norms may be rele-
vant to the jury's assessment of whether the lawyer-defendant acted
unlawfully and, therefore, allow the jury to be apprised of the relevant
norms, either through expert testimony where the norms are con-
tested, or through a jury instruction where the norms are essentially
undisputed. Allowing expert testimony or instructing the jury on the
content of relevant professional norms does not presuppose, however,
that the jury must give these norms any particular weight or signifi-
cance in assessing the accused lawyer's state of mind or conduct for
purposes of the criminal law.
Professor Freedman has written about the prosecution of Theodore
Friedman, a New York case in which Professor Hazard provided ex-
264. See id.
265. 698 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1997).
266. See id. at 534.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. Id. at 538 (citation omitted).
270. Id. (citation omitted).
271. See id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 537.
380 [Vol. 67
CRIMINAL REGULATION OF LAWYERS
pert testimony concerning relevant professional norms. Friedman, a
well-known plaintiffs' personal injury lawyer, was essentially accused
of deceiving the court by failing to disclose that one of his witnesses in
a civil suit had lied on cross-examination. 74 Professor Hazard testi-
fied in Friedman's defense that the lawyer's nondisclosure was consis-
tent with the applicable disciplinary rules,275 and Friedman was
acquitted.276
United States v. Wuliger277 is a case in which a judicial instruction on
the applicable professional norms was deemed appropriate. Wuliger,
an Ohio divorce lawyer, represented a husband who spent a week in-
tercepting and recording his wife's telephone conversations, including
conversations with her lawyer, priest, marriage counselor, and
friends.278 Under federal criminal law, if the wiretapping occurred
without the wife's consent, the recordings would be illegal and it
would also be a crime to use the tapes, knowing or having reason to
know that they had been made illegally. 279 However, when the client
gave the tapes to Wuliger for use in the divorce action, he represented
that he had recorded the telephone conversations with his wife's
knowledge. 80 Thereafter, Wuliger used the tapes as a basis of ques-
tions in deposing both the wife and the man with whom she was alleg-
edly then involved.281 On appeal from his conviction for thereby
violating the federal wiretapping law, Wuliger argued that the jury
should have been instructed that, as a lawyer, he had an absolute right
to believe what his client told him, so that he could rely on the client's
representation that the tapes were made with the wife's consent, even
if the nature of the conversations tended to belie that representa-
tion.32 The court did not accept this claim in its entirety, but did
agree that the professional norms were relevant to determining what a
lawyer has reason to know, because an attorney "should be able to
give his clients the benefit of the doubt."'
274. See Daniel Wise, Friedman Acquitted in Perjury Case, N.Y. L., Nov. 3, 1988,
at 1.
275. See Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 137, at 128 & n.75.
276. See id. at 128 n.77. Friedman was subsequently disbarred based in minor part
on the very conduct that had been in issue in the criminal case. See In re Friedman,
609 N.Y.S.2d 578 (App. Div. 1994).
277. 981 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1992).
278. See id. at 1499.
279. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994).
280. See Wuliger, 981 F.2d at 1500.
281. See id
282. See id at 1500-01.
283. Wuliger, 981 F.2d at 1505. The court reasoned:
The defendant argues that he should be able to rely on the factual represen-
tations of his client regardless of his personal opinion as to the client's credi-
bility. He points to his professional duty to present any evidence or theory
which is arguably viable, subject to standards of good faith and reasonable-
ness. Because he proceeded on the belief his client was telling the truth, the
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D. The Restatement's Approach: Relating Professional Norms to
the Court's Interpretation of the Criminal Law
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers focuses on the
court's role in interpreting the criminal provision under which the law-
yer is charged. Under its formulation, "[t]he traditional and appropri-
ate activities of lawyers in representing clients consistent with the
requirements of the applicable lawyer code are relevant factors for the
tribunal in assessing [the] propriety of a lawyer's conduct under the
law of crimes." 84 The accompanying Comment states that the tradi-
tions of the legal profession, as reflected in the lawyer codes, would
not supersede clearly applicable criminal provisions, since provisions
of the lawyer codes "do not purport to displace duties imposed on
lawyers and others by criminal law, but are drafted assuming the ap-
plicability of such law." '285 The Comment indicates, however, that
courts should construe a criminal provision "so as to make it consis-
tent with an applicable lawyer code provision" to the extent that a
court can do so "consistent with precedent and with accepted norms
governing construction of a criminal statute. 28 6
The Restatement's formulation presupposes that courts possess lim-
ited authority to interpret criminal provisions to accommodate profes-
sional norms. The formulation does not speak to the question of
whether, as in Stenhach and Mark Marks, a court should hold that
criminal provisions are constitutionally deficient where they fail ade-
quately to distinguish between permissible and impermissible conduct
by lawyers. However, it does not strongly encourage the possibility of
interpreting a criminal provision to achieve the same result by reading
into the criminal law an exemption of lawyers' professional conduct.
On the contrary, the Restatement suggests that, if the lawyer-defend-
ant cannot make a persuasive case that his own alleged conduct was
appropriate under the lawyer code, he cannot seek to avoid criminal
liability on the ground that other lawyers might be discouraged from
acting in professionally appropriate ways.
defendant contends he had no "reason to know" Mrs. Ricupero did not in
fact consent to the recordings.
There is nothing in the Act which affords attorneys special treatment. Ac-
cordingly, we find that the defendant was not entitled to a special instruction
on the reason to know standard solely because he used the tapes in his role
as attorney. However, an attorney's professional duties may be a factor in
determining whether there is reason to know that recorded information,
given by the client, was illegally obtained. Although an attorney must not
turn a blind eye to the obvious, he should be able to give his clients the
benefit of the doubt. This countervailing duty is one the jury may take into
account in deciding whether defendant had reason to know.
Id.
284. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 8 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 2, 1998).
285. Id. § 8 cmt. c.
286. Id.
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A lawyer-defendant's argument that he acted in a professionally ap-
propriate manner, which the criminal law should be construed to ac-
commodate, will face several obstacles under the Restatement's
formulation. The first is that the relevant professional norms are
often contested. Thus, the lawyer may have acted in accordance with
his own reasonable, widely-shared understanding of what is profes-
sionally appropriate behavior, yet that understanding may not be suf-
ficiently well embedded to be deemed "traditional." Another
problem is that even if there is a strong consensus as to their content,
the relevant professional norms may not be captured by provisions of
the lawyer code, which generally speak in terms that are restrictive,
rather than prescriptive. For example, the lawyer codes forbid law-
yers from knowingly presenting false testimony, but do not explicitly
require lawyers, as a matter of zealous advocacy, to present testimony
helpful to the client's case that is not known to be false. A third prob-
lem is that, to the extent that the lawyer codes might be read to pre-
scribe particular conduct, their prescriptions are almost invariably
limited by the criminal law, as discussed earlier and as the Comment
acknowledges.
Thus, the relationship between criminal law and inconsistent profes-
sional norms is somewhat paradoxical. If lawyers could contend that
the professional norms had the force of law, they would have a strong
claim of exemption from competing criminal law. After all, how can
one be criminally culpable for acting as another law requires? Yet,
the professional norms-even as embodied plainly in the lawyer
codes-are not "law" in the strong sense and, in any event, they ac-
commodate other law.287 The Restatement makes only the weaker
claim that, where the applicable criminal provision is particularly un-
clear, it should be construed to allow the lawyer to act in accordance
with relatively clear professional norms. Even this attenuated claim is
not particularly sympathetic insofar as it is understood to be merely an
argument about fair notice. Open-textured criminal provisions are
routinely applied to the conduct of non-lawyers, and, as the court ob-
served in Cueto, if anyone should be aware of the dictates of the crimi-
nal law, lawyers should be.
A final problem is that precedent and traditional rules of statutory
construction may not appear to leave courts much leeway to interpret
a particular criminal provision to accommodate professional norms.
Even where it seems to be universally understood that a professional
practice is lawful, traditional techniques of statutory construction may
make it hard to reach that conclusion. Consider the example of a cor-
poration's lawyer who, in an arm's length interview with an employee
prior to her appearance in the grand jury, seeks aggressively to per-
suade her that her initial version of a certain fact situation was not
287. See supra Part I.B.2.
1998]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
accurate and that an alternative version, which had been given to the
lawyer by another employee and was more favorable to the corpora-
tion, was more correct.2z 8 Unless the lawyer was seeking to persuade
the witness to swear to a version of events that the lawyer knew to be
false, the lawyer's conduct would be consistent with the lawyer
codes.28 9 Thus, in the likely event that the lawyer did not know or
care which, if either, version was true, the lawyer would have been
acting in a professionally appropriate manner. Suppose, however,
that the lawyer is charged under the federal witness tampering provi-
sion, 18 U.S.C. § 1512, with attempting to "corruptly persuade" an-
other person with intent to "influence" that person's testimony in an
official proceeding.29° It is unclear that conventional principles of in-
terpretation would enable the court to conclude that the law was inap-
plicable simply because the lawyer did not know that his alternative
version was false. Past precedent would not support the argument
that, as a matter of law, the lawyer's intent would not have been "cor-
rupt" in that event. Further, this interpretation would seem to be in-
consistent with a provision making it an affirmative defense that "the
conduct consisted solely of lawful conduct and that the defendant's
sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to
testify truthfully." 91 It is questionable whether a lawyer can establish
this defense when he did not know that the witness's initial version
was false and the alternative account was true. A lawyer might argue
that his motivation for aggressively asserting the alternative version of
events was ultimately to determine the truth, but it is doubtful a court
would conclude that the lawyer's intent was therefore innocent as a
matter of law.
Given all these obstacles, it is not surprising that few reported cases
appear to employ the Restatement's formulation. Although the Re-
porter's Note accompanying the Restatement provision identifies
Belge as one of two examples in which a lawyer code provision was
employed "to limit an interpretation of a criminal statute," 92 a differ-
ent reading of Belge is more plausible. The trial court in Belge did not
interpret the applicable public health laws to accommodate the pro-
fessional norms governing lawyer-client confidentiality, but rather dis-
missed the prosecution principally on the basis of a state law (which
288. See, e.g., United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (involving
the prosecution of an attorney charged with obstruction of justice where the attorney
allegedly counseled former employees of her client to lie to the grand jury).
289. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bright, 6 F.3d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 1993)
(holding that while it is impermissible to "ask a witness to swear to facts which are
knowingly false," it is permissible "in an arms-length interview with a witness, for an
attorney to attempt to persuade her, even agressively, that her initial version of a
certain fact situation is not complete or accurate").
290. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) (1994).
291. Id. § 1512(d).
292. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 8 Reporter's Note (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 2, 1998).
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has no federal counterpart) authorizing courts to dismiss a prosecu-
tion in the interests of justice.293 Had it been called on to do so, it is
uncertain that the court would have concluded that the public health
laws exempted lawyers from reporting client confidences. In preserv-
ing the client's confidences rather than disclosing the whereabouts of
his victim's corpse, Beige acted consistently with the ethical duty of
confidentiality, and insofar as the relevant public health laws were am-
biguous, the court might therefore have interpreted them to include
an implied exception where the information that would otherwise
have had to be reported was subject to a lawyer's duty of confidential-
ity. But the language of the public health laws were not necessarily
ambiguous, in the sense that they were open to a construction that
would exempt lawyers from disclosing client confidences.
IV. Two MODEST PROPOSALS
So far, this Article has been essentially descriptive. It has described
the ways in which criminal law may regulate lawyers, the criminal
law's relationship to other professional norms concerning lawyers,
how the application of the criminal law to lawyers' professional con-
duct might be considered excessively harsh in certain cases, and how
the criminal law potentially deters lawyers from engaging in lawful,
legitimate advocacy. This Article has made no claim, however, about
the extent to which prosecutors' decision-making, or the criminal law
generally, has actually influenced lawyers' professional work. It is un-
clear whether the criminal law's influence is precisely measurable. For
example, although members of the bar sometimes complain that pros-
ecutions of lawyers have a "chilling" effect-indeed, federal prosecu-
tors have themselves made this argument about disciplinary
prosecutions294 -there is no reason to accept these complaints at face
value, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to gauge the extent
to which criminal defense lawyers are in fact "chilled" from engaging
in particular conduct because of the threat of a criminal investigation
or prosecution. It should be clear, however, that there are various
ways in which the criminal law may have some influence on lawyers,
that the potential influence of the criminal law is substantial, and that,
as institutional enforcers of criminal provisions that bear on lawyers'
293. People v. Beige, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, 803 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771
(App. Div. 1975), affd, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976).
294. See Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910, 39,911
(1994) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 77) (proposed Aug. 4, 1994) (observing with respect
to judicial decisions holding that disciplinary rules regulating communications wvith
represented parties are applicable to federal prosecutors and their investigators that
"the heightened threat of disciplinary action that accompanies the expansive applica-
tion of these [disciplinary] rules [to federal prosecutors has created a chilling effect
on prosecutors responsible for directing these legitimate activities [i.e., preindictment
interviews and undercover investigations]").
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professional conduct, criminal prosecutors possess considerable power
to determine the nature and extent of the criminal law's impact.
Nor has this Article argued, thus far, that overdeterring lawyers is
necessarily a bad thing. As the Cintolo decision suggests, it is far from
self-evident why lawyers should be treated differently from others in
this regard. Principles of accessorial liability and obstruction-of-jus-
tice provisions are no less vague when applied to other profession-
als-bankers and doctors, for example-than when applied to
lawyers, and, thus, in theory have the same potential to "chill" other
professionals' conduct. The complaints of the criminal defense bar
may appear to be special pleading for lawyers; even the modest ac-
commodation proposed by the Restatement, and certainly the dismis-
sal of prosecutions in cases such as Mark Marks and Stenhach, beg the
question of why lawyers should be treated differently from everyone
else. Why shouldn't lawyers take particular care to avoid committing
crimes, even if this means forgoing certain lawful conduct? Others
approach the lines drawn by the criminal law at their own risk. Why
not lawyers?
Several elements, taken together, distinguish lawyers' professional
conduct from that of most others. First, lawyers are engaged in a pur-
suit that society believes to be particularly valuable. The professional
participation of lawyers promotes the fair resolution of criminal cases
and civil disputes and better enables "members of the public to secure
and protect available legal rights and benefits." 2" That is why com-
munications between an attorney and a client are privileged under the
law of evidence, while most other communications among individuals
are not. At least in the case of criminal defense lawyers, this profes-
sional undertaking has a constitutional dimension as well. Second, the
very nature of this pursuit places lawyers at risk because they deal
more often than others with individuals who are themselves engaged
in wrongdoing, and, especially in the case of criminal defense lawyers,
an aspect of the risk is that the lawyer's conduct or intentions may be
misperceived.296 Third, lawyers are regulated in various ways other
than by criminal law. Disciplinary rules and other professional norms
are directed specifically at the conduct of lawyers, while open-tex-
295. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-1 (1981).
296. As previously discussed, there are various reasons for this risk. Because law-
yers' conduct occurs largely in a confidential setting, only limited aspects of their con-
duct are made known to a prosecutor. Prosecutors, therefore, must rely on the
accounts of individuals whose credibility may be questionable and draw inferences
concerning aspects of the lawyers' conduct that cannot be known. Particularly in
dealing with defense lawyers, who may be viewed as professional adversaries, prose-
cutors may be uncharitable in resolving credibility questions and drawing inferences.
Cf Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 717 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting
"a serious concern that the threat of criminal prosecution under the capacious provi-
sions of [18 U.S.C.] § 1001 will deter vigorous representation of opposing interests in
adversarial litigation, particularly representation of criminal defendants, whose adver-
saries control the machinery of § 1001 prosecution").
[Vol. 67
CRIMINAL REGULATION OF LAWYERS
tured criminal-law provisions generally are not. Where professional
norms are clear, they are presumptively worthy of respect. Particu-
larly as they mediate between the interests of the lawyer's client and
the interests of third parties and the adjudicative system, the profes-
sional norms do not deserve to be dismissed out of hand, as they
sometimes are by prosecutors, as if they were the product of a self-
protecting trade association.
If one accepts that the professional norms, particularly as embodied
in the lawyer codes, are a reasonable articulation of the elements of
effective legal assistance, then criminal prosecutions that are in ten-
sion with professional norms should be a cause for concern. Depend-
ing on how the criminal law is understood, it may become difficult for
a lawyer to be effective, and thus serve the role that society and the
Sixth Amendment envision, while avoiding all risk. This is very differ-
ent from, for example, the situation of a surgeon who is concerned
about the risk of being prosecuted for negligent homicide as a result
of an unsuccessful medical procedure. There is a risk that prosecutors
and juries, lacking expertise in medical procedure, will make mistakes,
causing a doctor to be punished criminally when he does not deserve
to be. But there is no reason to assume that if doctors who perform
surgery take particular care to avoid this risk, they will be discouraged
from complying with established norms of the medical profession that
describe how to provide medical services effectively.
This Article offers two proposals to address the danger that the
criminal law may overregulate lawyers. The first, like the Restate-
ment provision, is directed at judges' interpretation of the criminal
law. The second is directed at prosecutors' exercise of discretion.
A. Interpreting Criminal Provisions
When interpreting provisions that are not clear about whether they
proscribe the professional conduct that is in issue in a case, courts
should be more accommodating of professional norms than the Re-
statement contemplates. Courts are not precluded by traditional tech-
niques of statutory construction from adopting limiting constructions
of the criminal law in cases involving lawyers. Courts regularly craft
laws to fill in the gaps of open-textured criminal provisions and legis-
latures contemplate that they will do so. As Dan Kahan has demon-
strated, federal courts underutilize the rule of lenity precisely because
they have criminal lawmaking authority.297 There is no reason for
courts to leave it to prosecutors and juries to draw these lines.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of federal extortion law to ac-
commodate elected officials' campaign finance activity serves as an
297. See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 345.
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analogy. In McCormick v. United States,2 98 the Court held that a pub-
lic official could not be convicted under the Hobbs Act for accepting a
campaign contribution with the knowledge that the contributor ex-
pected his official conduct to be influenced by the contribution. It
recognized that because fund raising is part of an elected official's eve-
ryday business, and officials regularly act for their constituents' bene-
fit, elected officials would face an unavoidable risk of prosecution,
with the outcome turning solely on the jury's assessment of the par-
ties' intentions. The Court concluded that "[ijt would require statu-
tory language more explicit than the Hobbs Act contains to justify"
this result.
There is no reason why criminal law should be more accommodat-
ing of political fund raising than of criminal defense advocacy or other
areas of legal practice. Both are examples of socially desirable con-
duct that would be easily chilled by a criminal provision that hinged
primarily on the actor's state of mind, because lawful conduct is easily
susceptible to erroneous inferences regarding the actor's intent or
knowledge. When a legislature seeks to criminalize conduct that is
deemed to be professionally desirable by the legal profession and the
courts (which generally promulgate the lawyer codes), the legislature
should do so clearly, and when it does not do so clearly, it is fair to
presume that it did not intend to do so at all. A similar presumption is
no less appropriate in addressing lawyers' professional conduct that
would reasonably be understood to be consistent with the professional
norms, even when the professional norms are subject to different un-
derstandings or are not firmly rooted in mandatory provisions of the
lawyer codes. There is no reason to believe that legislatures generally
intend for uncertain questions of professional conduct to be resolved
by prosecutors and juries through the application of open-textured
criminal provisions, rather than by courts through the promulgation or
interpretation of disciplinary rules. Accordingly, drawing on the ex-
ample of McCormick, courts should require clear statutory language
before interpreting a criminal provision to reach lawyers' professional
conduct, at least where the conduct comprises traditional advocacy in
accordance with a plausible construction of the professional norms
and the line between innocence and guilt therefore turns exclusively
on the lawyer's intentions, which a jury can determine only
inferentially.
B. Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion
To date, there does not appear to have been significant public dis-
cussion either among prosecutors themselves or between prosecutors
and other representatives of the organized bar concerning the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion in cases involving lawyers' professional
298. 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
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conduct. It may be assumed that prosecutors' decisions about
whether to accuse a lawyer of criminal wrongdoing, or to investigate
or prosecute a lawyer, are made on an ad hoc basis, as are most deci-
sions of this nature. Because the prosecution's deliberative process is
not public, and often the results (e.g., a decision not to investigate or
prosecute) are not publicly stated, it cannot be discerned whether
prosecutors are generally inclined to defer to the disciplinary process
in cases in which lawyers engaged in questionable conduct. Perhaps
most prosecutors give lawyers the benefit of the doubt. But there
have been enough cases in which the prosecution's factual allegations
or legal theories were questionable to make clear that not all do so.
There is not much that judges or anyone else can do to influence
prosecutors in this area. Criminal prosecutors have vast, and largely
unreviewable discretion to decide whom to investigate, what investi-
gative techniques to employ, whom to charge, and what charges to
bring. A court is unlikely to intervene until late in the process, after
criminal charges are filed, and even then, its authority is limited.
Thus, it is largely left to prosecutors to decide how the criminal law
will deal in general with lawyers and in particular with lawyers who
act in ways that may be justified by the norms ordinarily applicable to
lawyers' professional conduct. Prosecutors should proceed with re-
straint in addressing areas of lawyers' professional conduct where the
dictates of open-textured criminal provisions such as those dealing
with accomplice liability and obstruction of justice are in tension with
understandings embodied in other sources of professional norms such
as the lawyer codes. Prosecutors should consider the two dangers on
which this Article has focused. The first is the danger of overcriminal-
ization-that lawyers may be prosecuted in cases where their conduct
is wrongful but criminal punishment is nevertheless undeservedly
harsh in light of the criminal law's lack of clarity and the availability of
professional justifications for the proscribed conduct. The second is
the danger of overdeterrence-that, out of fear of an investigation or
conviction, lawyers will avoid certain professional conduct that is law-
ful and professionally praiseworthy.
These problems are not entirely avoidable given the existence of
multiple sets of less-than-clear laws or standards, including those em-
bodied in criminal law and lawyer codes, bearing on lawyers' profes-
sional conduct, as well as the existence of multiple enforcers of
professional standards.2 99 But suppose that all the sources of profes-
sional norms were integrated and that a single agency was responsible
for enforcing provisions of law-be they criminal, civil, or disciplinary
provisions-applicable to lawyers. What would be the characteristics
299. Cf. Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators
Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 69 (1995) (arguing that the
existence of multiple regulators leads to underenforcement of professional norms re-
lating to federal prosecutors).
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of a rational body of law, rationally enforced? The answers might
provide some guidance to prosecutors even under the present regime.
Integrating the law and ethics of lawyering would allow the law
more clearly to embody rational distinctions between criminal law and
prophylactic disciplinary provisions that establish, in Professor Cof-
fee's term, a "penumbra" around the criminal law. 00 While criminal
conduct should be subject to disciplinary sanctions, disciplinary viola-
tions should not generally serve as the predicate of criminal prosecu-
tions. For example, the disciplinary prohibition on assisting clients'
criminal conduct should be broader than the criminal prohibition, not
the other way around.3"' The criminal law should set a standard of
conduct independent of lawyers' ethical or fiduciary obligations.
Integrating the processes by which the law and ethics of lawyering is
enforced would permit enforcement agencies to reserve criminal pros-
ecutions for cases in which the lawyer's misconduct was clearly wrong-
ful. In a case where there was uncertainty, the propriety of the
lawyer's conduct would be resolved in a disciplinary proceeding rather
than a criminal prosecution. Resolving factual ambiguities in discipli-
nary proceedings would reduce the risk of overdeterrence, because
lawyers would have less need to refrain from conduct that is lawful
and professionally desirable to avoid the risk of an erroneous criminal
investigation or prosecution; resolving legal ambiguities in disciplinary
proceedings would reduce the risk of overcriminalization by providing
courts an opportunity outside the criminal context to clarify the scope
of the criminal law while avoiding the criminal prosecution of lawyers
for conduct that does not deserve such harsh treatment given the
then-unresolved state of the law. When the ambiguity was resolved
against the lawyer, he would be disbarred, suspended, or otherwise
sanctioned in disciplinary proceedings for the commission of a crime,
and the disciplinary sanction would satisfy the purposes of criminal
punishment.0 2
300. See John C. Coffe, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil
Law Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 Yale L.J. 1875, 1887 (1992).
301. See Hazard et al., Ethics of Lawyering, supra note 66, at 676-77 (asserting that
the lawyer's responsibility to refrain from aiding a client in illegal acts is more strin-
gent due to DR 7-101(B)(2)); Green, Zealous Representation, supra note 182, at 716
(stating that lawyers should have the discretion not to approach the line of the crimi-
nal law).
302. From the perspective of lawyer regulation, disciplinary sanctions are not tradi-
tionally regarded as punishments but as measures to protect the public from an un-
qualified lawyer, which is why a lawyer who has been convicted of a crime and
punished criminally may fairly be subject to a disciplinary sanction. See Bradway,
supra note 113, at 22 & nn.47-48 (noting that courts have held that a disbarment
proceeding "is not a criminal matter" but is undertaken "for the purification of the
profession"). From the criminal law's perspective, however, a disciplinary sanction
such as disbarment should surely be viewed as fulfilling the purposes of criminal pun-
ishment since it extracts significant cost, expresses condemnation of the lawyer's con-
duct, and deters future professional misconduct. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, Punishment
Incommensurability, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 691 (1998) (arguing that penalties, in con-
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Given the disaggregation of both the law and the enforcement
mechanisms relevant to lawyers' professional conduct, dealing with
lawyers' criminal conduct rationally may be difficult. Under the pres-
ent regime, professional ethics will not always create a penumbra
around the criminal law, either because the criminal law may be read
to incorporate whatever restrictions are embodied in ethics rules or
because the drafters of ethics rules, believing that the criminal law is
already too restrictive, are reluctant to impose further restrictions by
means of ethics rules. Further, a disciplinary proceeding will not al-
ways be a realistic alternative to a criminal prosecution in a case
where the facts or law are unclear, because the disciplinary agency
may not have the same access to evidence as a criminal prosecutor or
may be unwilling to expend limited resources in an ambiguous case.
Thus, a prosecutor may perceive that the only feasible way of regulat-
ing the lawyer is through a criminal prosecution.
Even under the present regime, however, prosecutors should not
invoke the criminal law as a way of resolving disagreements within the
legal profession concerning how lawyers should properly act on behalf
of clients or as a way of choosing among competing conceptions of the
private lawyer's appropriate professional role. It is a questionable and
highly controversial venture even for prosecutors unilaterally to make
the ethical rules governing their own conduct, as they have done selec-
tively.30 3 While the open-textured criminal provisions dealing with ac-
cessorial liability and obstruction of justice were not intended to
incorporate the philosophy of the American Bar Association or the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, neither were they
intended to incorporate the philosophy of the Attorney General or
the District Attorney.
CONCLUSION
The criminal law has significance in regulating lawyers' professional
conduct both because it provides an effective means of enforcing cer-
tain professional norms and because it establishes or influences the
content of certain professional norms. The criminal law's regulatory
role is most interesting, and potentially troubling, in situations where
the criminal law points lawyers in one direction but other professional
norms, such as those embodied in the lawyer codes, appear to point
junction with fines and community service, provide an acceptable alternative to
prison); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L Rev. 591
(1996) (describing how sanctions can be reformed to make them a feasible alternative
to imprisonment).
303. See generally Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should
Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?. 64 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 460, 486-89 (1996) (arguing that the process by which the Department
of Justice promulgated its regulation governing communications %%ith represented in-
dividuals suffered from a lack of objectivity on the part of the government lawyers
responsible for the regulation).
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lawyers in the opposite direction. This problem has drawn attention
from the American Law Institute, the criminal defense bar, and
courts, among others, without anything approaching a consensus
emerging. This Article has offered two modest, and by no means com-
plete or completely satisfying, responses. First, courts should interpret
open-textured criminal provisions to accommodate professional con-
duct that is consistent with a reasonable understanding of the profes-
sional norms, thus putting the burden on the legislature to manifest its
intent to forbid such conduct. Second, prosecutors should exercise re-
straint in conducting criminal investigations and prosecutions of law-
yers based on factually or legally ambiguous conduct.
